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RETHINKING NOVELTY IN PATENT LAW
SEAN B. SEYMORE†
ABSTRACT
The novelty requirement seeks to ensure that a patent will not issue
if the public already possesses the invention. Although gauging
possession is usually straightforward for simple inventions, it can be
difficult for those in complex fields like biotechnology, chemistry, and
pharmaceuticals. For example, if a drug company seeks to patent a
promising molecule that was disclosed but never physically made in
the prior art, the key possession question is whether a person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) could have made it at the time of
the prior disclosure. Put differently, could the PHOSITA rely on
then-existing knowledge in the field to fill in any missing technical
details from the prior disclosure? This Article argues that existing
novelty jurisprudence mishandles the possession question in two
ways. First, it tends to overestimate the PHOSITA’s then-existing
knowledge by failing to fully appreciate the complex nature of certain
technologies. Second, the current examination framework vitiates the
presumption of novelty by placing proof burdens on the would-be
inventor that can thwart innovation and frustrate important objectives
of the patent system. To resolve these problems and to fill a gap in
patent scholarship, this Article proposes a new paradigm that
reframes the novelty inquiry during patent examination. Its
implementation will not only improve the quality of issued patents,
but also make the patent literature a more robust source of technical
information. This Article contributes to broader policy debates over
patent reform and joins a larger effort to bridge the disconnect
between patent law and the norms of science.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. patent system is a pendulum. It swings back and forth,
attempting to balance the need to reward inventors for their work
against the need to foster innovation through the dissemination of
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1

technical knowledge. When the pendulum swings too far in one
2
3
direction, the courts, Congress, and even the U.S. Patent and
4
Trademark Office (Patent Office) seek to make adjustments through
patent reform. Perhaps due to criticisms that the system has become
5
too “pro-patent,” reform efforts in recent years have led to the
6
scaling back of patent rights. Some of these reforms have tightened
7
the standards for patentability. Indeed, patentability has become a

1. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the
information disclosed in the patent adds to the public storehouse of knowledge); Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent
system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”);
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing a patent as “a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829)
(recognizing that the patent system seeks to promote the progress of the useful arts and to
reward inventors); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1518)
(“Patents for inventions are . . . a just reward [for ingenuity], and . . . highly beneficial to the
public, not only by holding out suitable encouragements to genius and talents and enterprise;
but as ultimately securing to the whole community great advantages from the free
communication of [knowledge], which may be most important to all the great interests of
society . . . .”).
2. See infra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
3. E.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced by Rep.
Conyers, Mar. 3, 2009), 155 CONG. REC. H2923 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of
2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy, Mar. 3, 2009), 155 CONG. REC.
S2691, S2706–16 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
(2007) (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007), 153 CONG. REC. H10,307 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007);
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy, Apr. 18,
2007), 153 CONG. REC. S4675, S4685–92 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007).
4. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2010–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 10–25
(2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf
(describing several initiatives that will improve examination timelines and patent quality); Press
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Will Begin Study of Patent Examiners’
Production Goals (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2007/07-42.jsp
(predicting that the study will lead to changes in the Patent Office that will “motivate
employees, improve [the] work environment, and enhance the quality and efficiency of the
patent examination process”).
5. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 98–107
(2004) (exploring trends in the Federal Circuit toward strengthening patentees’ rights); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
111, 128 (2004) (concluding that the “pro-patent leanings” of the Federal Circuit have “had a
significant effect on patent activity”).
6. See infra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
7. The conditions for patentability are found in Title 35 of the United States Code. In
short, the claimed invention must be useful, novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable
subject matter. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006). In addition, § 112, ¶ 1, requires that the application
adequately describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention; and
§ 112, ¶ 2, requires that the application conclude with claims that delineate the invention with
particularity.
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hot topic as reform-minded courts, in a series of landmark decisions,
have relied on narrowing it to trim the scope of patent-eligible subject
8
matter and to make patents harder to obtain (and easier to
9
invalidate) based on obviousness.
These reform efforts have rekindled broader discussions about
other patentability requirements. One that has received relatively
little attention in recent commentary is novelty, which is the statutory
10
requirement that an invention be new. Determining novelty requires
a comparison of the invention that the applicant seeks to patent with
the “prior art,” which refers to preexisting knowledge and technology
11
already available to the public. Documents like issued patents and
12
printed publications are common sources of prior art. A document
asserted against the invention that the applicant seeks to patent is
13
called a prior art reference.
To qualify as novelty-defeating prior art, the reference must
14
satisfy three conditions. First, it must predate the applicant’s
invention or have existed more than one year before the applicant’s
15
16
filing date. Second, every element of the claimed invention must be
identically disclosed or described within the four corners of the prior

8. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that claims relating to a
method of hedging risks are unpatentable).
9. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsistency with the “expansive and flexible” approach
set forth in Supreme Court precedent).
10. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
11. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (defining the documents and activities that can serve as prior art).
13. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (3d ed. 2001).
14. Prior art is also used to determine whether an invention is obvious. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (providing that an invention is not patentable “if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains”). For a discussion of obviousness and its relationship
to novelty, see infra notes 104 and 170.
15. Prior art provisions fall into two main categories: (1) the novelty provisions of
§§ 102(a), (e), and (g), which depend on the invention date; and (2) the loss-of-right provisions
of § 102(b), which depend on the applicant’s filing date. See 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER
ON PATENTS § 8:1 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining § 102 of the Patent Act).
16. A patent claim must define “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim element further limits the breadth of the claim. 1
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, at Gl-3 (2009). For an illustration, see infra note 19
and accompanying text.
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17

art reference. This is referred to as the “strict identity”
18
requirement. So, for example, if an applicant seeks to claim a paper
clip made with titanium and nickel, the reference must also disclose a
19
paper clip made with titanium and nickel. Third, the reference must
20
be enabling. This means that the reference must disclose the subject
matter in sufficient detail to enable a person having ordinary skill in
21
22
the art (PHOSITA) to make it without undue experimentation. If a
23
reference meets all three criteria, it “anticipates” the claim and

17. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The identical invention must be shown in as complete
detail as is contained in the patent claim.”); see also Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park
Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that another reference or knowledge
in the art cannot supply missing elements).
18. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting
the “strict identity” test for novelty); see also Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756
F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that “a prior art disclosure which is only
‘substantially the same’ as the claimed invention” is insufficient to defeat novelty).
19. In this hypothetical, titanium and nickel are claim elements. See supra note 16.
20. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In
order to anticipate, a prior art reference must not only disclose all of the limitations of the
claimed invention, but also be enabled.”); Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. &
Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To serve as an anticipating reference, the
reference must enable that which it is asserted to anticipate.”).
21. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent
person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”).
Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include “(1) the
educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art
solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of
the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v.
Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
22. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For a
discussion of what constitutes undue experimentation, see infra Part I.B.2.
23. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“Anticipation requires the disclosure in a single prior art reference of each element of the
claim under consideration.”); see also Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). “In
deciding the issue of anticipation, the trier of fact must identify the elements of the claims,
determine their meaning . . . , and identify corresponding elements disclosed in the allegedly
anticipating reference.” Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771
(Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled by SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 377 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
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renders it unpatentable (or invalid) for lack of novelty because the
25
subject matter is considered to be in the public’s possession.
Although the foregoing analysis tends to be simple for paper
clips, it can be difficult for more-complex subject matter. For
example, consider an inventor at a drug company who seeks to obtain
a patent on a promising compound, X. At the time of filing, X is, as
far as the inventor knows, previously unknown. Yet, during patent
26
examination, the examiner uncovers a third-party patent that
discloses, but does not claim, X and makes a few speculative
27
statements about how compounds like X might be made. Is this
modicum of disclosure sufficiently enabling to anticipate? If it offers
no more than a starting point for further experimentation, the answer

24. Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 1
CHISUM, supra note 16, at G1-14 (defining novelty as a basic patentability requirement that
“precludes any claim that is anticipated by any single reference in the prior art”). Though
§ 102(b) is technically not a novelty provision, “[i]t is clearly established that novelty is
lacking . . . when the [§ 102(b)] prior art product or process is identical to that of the inventor’s
product or process.” 2 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 6.02[3].
25. Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As a
general matter, patent applicants aggressively seek to limit the universe of prior art that can be
asserted against them during examination. The easiest way to accomplish this is to show that a
particular reference cannot serve as prior art because of its publication date. For example, an
applicant facing a lack-of-novelty rejection based on a journal article published the day after the
applicant’s filing date can simply identify the date discrepancy and compel the Patent Office to
remove the reference and withdraw the rejection. This is true even if the reference discloses an
identical paper clip made with titanium and nickel. The analysis is simple and objective because
§ 102 determines when references become available as prior art. Nonetheless, applicants have
an incentive to ensure that the examiner considers all potentially patent-defeating prior art. See
Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that an accused infringer
may invalidate a patent more easily if the examiner never considered the asserted prior art).
26. It is often forgotten that the patent document serves several key roles in the patent
system. Most prominently, the claims establish the boundaries of the patentee’s right to exclude,
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006), which expires twenty years from the earliest effective filing date, id.
§ 154(a)(2). But in addition, the disclosure (the written description and the drawings) of a
patent or published patent application can serve as prior art. Id. § 102(a), (b), (e). A patent is
effective as prior art as of its filing date and remains so forever (just like a book, a magazine, or
any other printed publication). See id. § 102(e)(2) (providing that an invention is not patentable
if it is described in “a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention by the applicant for patent”); In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1385
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that § 102(e) “codified the history of treating the disclosure of a
U.S. patent as prior art as of the filing date of the earliest U.S. application to which the patent is
entitled” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).
27. For a discussion of why patentees might disclose subject matter but not claim it, see
infra notes 124–29, 230–35 and accompanying text.
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28

should be no. Regardless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Federal Circuit) has held that, for the sake of expediency, the
examiner is allowed to presume that the third-party patent is
29
enabling. In practical terms, this means that the subsequent inventor
bears the affirmative burden of proving that the third-party patent is
30
not enabling.
This paradigm raises significant issues, some of which have
31
received little attention in patent scholarship. First, as a substantive
matter, in certain fields a PHOSITA needs actual experimental
32
details to make the invention without undue experimentation.
Second, placing the burden on the inventor to prove that a prior art
reference is nonenabling vitiates the presumption of patentability that
33
applicants should enjoy during examination. Third, given these first
two points, it is not uncommon for patentees “to pad the patent

28. In the words of Judge Learned Hand,
If the earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for further experiments, if
its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, if it does not inform the
[PHOSITA how to make] the new invention, it has not correspondingly enriched the
store of common knowledge, and it is not an anticipation.
Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942).
29. See infra Part II.A. Documentary sources that may serve as prior art include patents
and scientific journal articles. See supra text accompanying note 11. Regarding the latter
category, the Federal Circuit has not decided whether nonpatent references are entitled to a
presumption of enablement. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313,
1355 n.22 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We note that by logical extension, our reasoning here might also
apply to [nonpatent] prior art printed publications as well, but as Sugimoto is a patent we need
not and do not so decide today.” (emphasis added)).
30. See infra Part II.A.2.
31. Scholarship that addresses enablement in the prior art context is limited. See, e.g.,
Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid, 15
AIPLA Q.J. 57, 63 (1987) (“A reference that was not enabling upon its publication can become
enabling and therefore an anticipation at a later time when additional prior art becomes
available—showing, for example, a method of making the disclosed invention.”); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 171–73 (2006) (arguing that the
Federal Circuit’s “motivation to combine” doctrine incorporates an enablement standard into
the obviousness determination); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s
Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1131–54 (2008) (arguing that courts
should apply a heightened enablement standard when making inherent anticipation
determinations); Alan W. White, The Novelty-Destroying Disclosure: Some Recent Decisions, 12
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 315, 316–19 (1990) (exploring British cases that address enablement
based on prior disclosures).
32. See infra Part I.B.2.
33. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
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literature with chaff, presumably to muddy the waters in a defensive
34
or nuisance maneuver” to thwart subsequent, deserving inventors.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the current paradigm has
a potential negative effect on innovation. Suppose X in the previous
example is a drug molecule. In their recent comprehensive study of
the U.S. patent system, Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer
show empirically that over two-thirds of the value of worldwide
patents accrues to chemical and pharmaceutical firms, and that more
35
than half accrues to a small number of large pharmaceutical firms.
They conclude that chemical and pharmaceutical patents are
36
“substantially more valuable than other patents overall.” Why is this
so? First, given that the claims often depict discrete molecular
structures, the boundaries are clearly defined and thus easier to
37
38
police. Second, these patents tend to be broad in scope. Third and
34. David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 221, 221–22 (1999). For a further discussion of the tactic of disclosing subject matter
to deliberately thwart a subsequent inventor’s claim, see infra notes 124–29.
35. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 109 (2008). The researchers define
“value” as the private value of the relevant patent, which derives from the right to exclude. Id.
at 97. This value “is measured relative to the alternative means an innovator has for profiting
from her invention,” including trade secrecy and profits on complementary goods. Id. at 98.
Unlike most other industries, the pharmaceutical industry views patents as the most effective
means of profiting from inventions. See OLIVER GASSMANN, GERRIT REEPMEYER &
MAXIMILIAN VON ZEDTWITZ, LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: TRENDS AND
DRIVERS FOR GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 133–34 (2d ed. 2008) (“[Patent]
protection is crucial in the pharmaceutical industry as otherwise nobody would invest in
expensive and long-term drug development.”); see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 tbl.1 (1986) (reporting that 65 percent
of products from the pharmaceutical industry would not have been brought to market without
patent protection, which contrasts with considerably lower numbers for products from other
industries). Indeed, “it is well known that pharmaceutical companies generally refuse to develop
new drugs unless they have strong patent protection over them.” Benjamin N. Roin,
Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 513 (2009).
36. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 107. The payoff is important because
pharmaceutical companies need to recoup their research and development investments. See
Roin, supra note 35, at 510 & n.21 (collecting sources which estimate that pharmaceutical
companies spend an average of at least $800 million to bring a new drug to market).
37. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1251, 1279 (2004) (observing that it is easier to detect and show infringement in discrete
technologies); Richard C. Levin, Alin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 798 (arguing that patents are particularly effective in the
chemical arts because relatively clear standards can be applied to assess validity and to defend
against infringement); see also Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh,
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing
Firms Patent (or Not) 18–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000),
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relatedly, it is often difficult for competitors to “invent around” the
39
compound of interest. These qualities can converge to produce a so40
called blockbuster drug patent. A single compound (X) can thus
41
generate billions of dollars in annual revenue. And perhaps not
available
at
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/smartin/courses/590/NBER7552.pdf
(exploring cross-industry differences in patenting).
38. In preparing the claims, a savvy drafter often includes a broad claim encompassing a
large number—frequently millions—of individual compounds, which serves as a “net” to
ensnare everything using the basic concept of the patentee. See HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT
LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS § 87, at 114 (2d ed. 1994)
(“Claims of varying scope should be provided to take advantage of the multiple claim system. A
broad ‘claim 1’ is fine as a net to try to capture everyone using the basic concept of the
patentee.” (citation omitted)). For an extreme example, see U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed
June 21, 1991). This particular patent includes a structural formula in claim 1 that encompasses
60
at least one novemdecillion (10 , or one followed by sixty zeroes) chemical compounds. Id. cols.
133–34. Given that a pharmaceutical patent application is often filed at an early stage of
research and development when end results or uses remain uncertain, the resulting patent is like
an expensive lottery ticket with the hoped-for payoff being the substantial revenue generated by
at least one claimed molecule. Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using
Statistical Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 328 n.30 (2002)
(using a lottery analogy); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1521, 1548 (2005) (same).
39. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1616–17 (2003) (explaining that pharmaceutical patents must be broad enough to prevent
invent-arounds). In addition to the possibility of infringement, the unpredictable nature of
chemistry hinders the development of successful invent-arounds because “even a minute change
to a chemical molecule results in an entirely non-substitutable product.” Barnett, supra note 37,
at 1279.
40. The pharmaceutical industry defines a blockbuster drug as one that generates at least
$1 billion in annual revenue. RONALD J. VOGEL, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 25 (2007). This payoff is important because pharmaceutical companies need to recoup
their research and development investments. See Roin, supra note 35, at 510 & n.21 (collecting
sources that estimate that pharmaceutical companies spend an average of at least $800 million
to bring a new drug to market).
41. Many pharmaceutical companies rely on a few blockbuster drugs to recoup their
investment in innovation and to cover the costs of failed products. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY ch. 3, at 5 (2003); see also Roin, supra note 35, at 510 & n.21 (“Pharmaceutical
companies on average spend upwards of $800 million on R&D for each new drug that reaches
the market.”). A pharmaceutical company may screen hundreds of thousands of chemical
compounds as likely candidates for development, but for “every 10,000 compounds that are
evaluated in animal studies, 10 will make it to human clinical trials in order to get 1 compound
on the market.” RICHARD B. SILVERMAN, THE ORGANIC CHEMISTRY OF DRUG DESIGN AND
DRUG ACTION 8 (2d ed. 2004). In addition, bringing a new drug to market can take twelve to
fifteen years and can cost over $800 million. Id.; see also Christopher P. Adams & Van V.
Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 420, 424 (2006) (estimating a total cost of $868 million per approved drug); Joseph A.
DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the total research
and development cost per drug as $802 million). To appreciate the amount of revenue that a
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surprisingly, the blockbuster drug usually spawns significant research
42
activity aiming to produce competitive or follow-on products. The
ability to derive these rewards from X, however, is jeopardized if the
compound is deemed unpatentable because of a prior disclosure of its
name or structure. Denying a patent to someone who can actually
enable X can frustrate both the economic and innovation-related
43
goals of the patent system.
This Article attempts to address these issues and explore a new
analytical framework for gauging novelty for complex inventions. For
concreteness, the Article focuses on the common scenario described
in the foregoing discussion: when a third party’s patent is asserted as
44
novelty-defeating prior art against a would-be inventor. This Article

blockbuster drug can generate, consider the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor—the best-selling
drug of all time—which generated over $13.6 billion in revenue for Pfizer in 2006. See
GASSMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 tbl.2 (analyzing blockbuster drug data); see also Matthew
Herper & Peter Kang, The World’s Ten Best-Selling Drugs, FORBES.COM (Mar. 27, 2006, 6:00
AM ET), http://www.forbes.com/2006/03/21/pfizer-merck-amgen-cx_mh_pk_0321topdrugs.html
(revealing that Lipitor’s annual sales are more than twice as high as its closest competitor). The
Lipitor patent expires in June 2011. See U.S. Patent No. RE40,667 (filed Jan. 16, 2007) (reissue
patent); U.S. Patent No. 5,273,995 (filed Feb. 26, 1991) (original patent); see also Susan Decker,
Pfizer Wins New Lipitor Patent Expiring in June 2011 (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2009,
4:46 PM EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aNSygEPe7QWw&pid=newsarchive
(discussing the reissue of Pfizer’s patent on Lipitor’s key ingredient after the company modified
“inconsistent language” that an appellate court had found rendered the patent invalid).
42. See STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 51 (2d ed.
2007) (“[Biotechnology firms that] are able to generate revenue . . . typically reinvest in their
products (and in follow-on products in the pipeline) in hopes of discovering yet another new
drug, perhaps a spin-off of the earlier one.”).
43. See infra Part III.B.4.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 26–30. This is a common scenario because
examiners in the Patent Office are familiar with patents and have easy access to them. Thus,
most prior art rejections are likely to involve patent documents. See John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 101–02
(2002) (presenting empirical findings on references to prior art); see also John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2120 (2000) (“The predominance of U.S. patents [as cited prior art]
may . . . reflect the limitations of the [Patent Office] systems for searching: the [Patent Office] is
much more likely to find documents that it itself has generated.”). This Article does not explore
scenarios in which the inventor’s own prior activities or disclosure can serve as noveltydefeating prior art, although such scenarios can be problematic, particularly in the academic and
drug-discovery contexts. See Roin, supra note 35, at 527–31 (discussing the difficulty of
satisfying the novelty requirement in university and drug-development contexts because of the
possibility of premature disclosure); Sean B. Seymore, The “Printed Publication” Bar After
Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About Science?,
40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 495 (2007) (“Klopfenstein is particularly important in the realm of
academic science because it suggests that under certain circumstances a run-of-the-mill research
talk can become a § 102(b) ‘printed publication’ and trigger the one-year clock.”).
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fills a gap in patent scholarship and contributes to broader policy
debates over patent reform. It is part of a larger project to bridge the
45
disconnect between patent law and the norms of science.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the basic novelty
question, which is whether the public already possesses the invention.
It explores the technical difficulties that arise in answering this
question for inventions in unpredictable fields like chemistry,
46
biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. After briefly describing the
current examination framework, Part II turns to what is perhaps the
most important unresolved issue in the law of anticipation: whether
and under what circumstances the appearance of a chemical name or
structure in the prior art anticipates a subsequent inventor’s claim for
the compound. Although the Patent Office and the courts have
wrestled with the “quintessential novelty problem” since the earliest
days of the chemical era, this Part contends that current anticipation
doctrines and vestiges of older ones often produce paradoxical

45. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement] (proposing a new
approach for examining patent applications in unpredictable technologies which, by requiring
applicants to disclose actual experimental results, resolves a striking incongruity between patent
law and the experimental sciences); Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009)
[hereinafter Seymore, Serendipity] (arguing that although accidental discoveries pervade
science, inventors who invent by accident can be unjustly deprived of patents because such
discoveries do not mesh with the substantive law of invention); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching
Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching
Function] (proposing a disclosure regime that would allow patents to compete with other forms
of technical literature as a source of substantive technical information).
46. The courts refer to chemistry, biotechnology, and related experimental fields as
“unpredictable” because skilled artisans in these fields often cannot predict whether a reaction
protocol that works for one embodiment will work for others. Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg,
Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the
chemical arts, “a slight variation . . . can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at all”).
On the other hand, applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often
regarded as “predictable” arts because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But enablement depends on the facts in a given case
because, for example, a mechanical device can have unpredictable features. See In re Bowen,
492 F.2d 859, 861–62 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (criticizing the dichotomy and advocating an alternative
classification). For a deeper exploration of the predictable/unpredictable dichotomy, see
Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 45, at 136–39; and Sean B. Seymore, The
Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282–84 (2008). The
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A.
decisional law as binding precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1982) (en banc).
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outcomes seemingly incongruous with basic principles of patent law.
To that end, Part III offers a new patent examination framework that
reframes the novelty inquiry. By eliminating presumptions and
shifting burdens of proof, the new paradigm will at last resolve the
quintessential novelty problem, foster innovation, and promote other
goals of patent policy. Finally, in response to some of the concerns
that accompany the new paradigm, this Part explores how it will
improve the quality of both issued patents and the patent literature.
I. NOVELTY AND POSSESSION
A. Does the Invention Already Belong to the Public?
A bedrock principle of patent law is that a patent cannot issue if
47
it would remove technology that is already in the public domain. The
corollary is that inventions “must be new, that is, bestowed for the
48
first time upon the public by the patentee.” As nineteenth-century
legal historian George Ticknor Curtis wrote in his famous treatise on
patent law, when the invention has already been described in the
prior art,
the public have acquired nothing from the [disclosure] of the
patentee[] which they did not possess before, and . . . the patentee
has invented nothing, which he, as one of the public, could not have
derived from the means of knowledge which the public before
possessed. Hence it is, that the production of a prior description,
which was in the possession of the public, negatives the title of the
49
patentee as the first inventor.

47. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989) (noting
that Thomas Jefferson, the “driving force behind early federal patent policy,” believed that “a
grant of patent rights in an idea already disclosed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto law,
‘obstruct[ing] others in the use of what they possessed before’” (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
326, 327 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903))); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (explaining that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to authorize
the issuance of patents that would remove existing knowledge from the public domain); Max
Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA.
L. REV. 229, 236–42 (1999) (exploring the constitutional basis and statutory background for
prohibiting the granting of patents that would remove technology from the public domain).
48. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 305
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890).
49. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 292 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1854) (footnote
omitted); cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent

SEYMORE IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

12/29/2010 5:30:42 PM

RETHINKING NOVELTY IN PATENT LAW

931

To allow otherwise would not only add nothing to the sum of human
50
knowledge, but “would in fact injure the public by removing existing
51
knowledge from public use.” Thus, novelty serves to safeguard the
52
public’s right to enjoy what it already possesses.
B. The Enablement Question
Anticipation requires, first, strict identity between the previously
53
disclosed and the now-claimed subject matter; and, second, an
54
enabling disclosure. Although checking for strict identity is often
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2000) (“Granting patents on technologies that are not
new would impose the social costs of monopolies without the countervailing benefits of
promoting development and introduction of welfare-enhancing inventions.”).
50. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“An inventor
deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of
value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.”); see also 1 ROBINSON,
supra note 48, at 305 (“If the same [knowledge] has been already made accessible to [the public]
by the inventive genius . . . no benefit results to them from his inventive act and there is no
consideration for his patent.”).
51. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148. Therefore, the logic behind the novelty requirement “is
fairly straightforward . . . . [because if] information is already in the public domain when the
‘inventor’ seeks to patent it[,] society has no need to grant a patent to get this information.”
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12–13
(1992).
52. As the late Judge Giles S. Rich once wrote about knowledge already present in the
public domain, “Society, speaking through Congress and the courts, has said ‘thou shalt not take
it away.’” Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
53. Anticipation occurs if the prior art discloses what the applicant seeks to claim. See
supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
54. In other words, the prior art reference must disclose the subject matter in sufficient
detail to enable a PHOSITA to make it without undue experimentation. See supra notes 20–25
and accompanying text. The requirement that an anticipatory reference contain an enabling
disclosure can be traced back to Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1870). In that case,
an accused infringer attempted to use a foreign publication to invalidate the patent-at-issue. Id.
at 554. Finding the publication’s disclosure inadequate, the Supreme Court stated,
Patented inventions cannot be superseded by the mere introduction of [the
reference], though of prior date, unless the description . . . contain[s] . . . a substantial
representation of the patented improvement, in such full, clear, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, to make,
construct, and practice the invention to the same practical extent as they would be
enabled to do if the information was derived from a prior patent. Mere vague and
general representations will not support such a defence . . . .
Id. at 555; cf. Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 370 (1876) (“It must be admitted that, unless
the earlier [reference] does exhibit the later patented invention in such a full and intelligible
manner as to enable persons skilled in the art to which the invention is related to comprehend it
without assistance from the patent, or to make it, or repeat the process claimed, it is insufficient
to invalidate the patent.”). In support of its holding, the Seymour Court cited the Curtis treatise,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 555 n.*, which states that
the description [in the allegedly anticipatory reference] must be such as to give the
public the means of knowledge, or, in other words, must of itself enable the public to
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quite easy, gauging enablement is not. This last point is particularly
important because the question of whether the public already
possesses the claimed subject matter often reduces to a question of
55
enablement.
1. Defining the Standard. Enablement questions typically arise in
56
two contexts in patent law. Section 112, ¶ 1, of the Patent Act
57
compels a patent applicant to submit a written description that
enables a PHOSITA to make and use the full scope of the claimed
58
invention without undue experimentation. This “statutory” or
patent-supporting form of enablement places an outer limit on the
59
scope of the claims. By contrast, the form pertaining to prior art
references discussed earlier is referred to as “anticipatory” or patentdefeating enablement, because it is used to demonstrate that a
60
PHOSITA could use preexisting knowledge to make the invention.

practise the invention. It is not necessary that the invention should have been reduced
to practice, but, unless the description would enable the public, without further
invention, to put the thing in practice, it cannot be said that a knowledge of that thing
is in the possession of the public.
CURTIS, supra note 49, § 292 (emphases added).
55. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“Enablement looks to placing the subject matter of the claims generally in the possession of the
public.”).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
57. The written description is the part of the patent (or patent application) in which the
patentee discloses the invention. See supra note 26.
58. The statutory disclosure requirement has four parts, which appear in the first and
second paragraphs of § 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1–2 (emphases added). Although the term “undue experimentation” does
not appear in the statute, “it is well established that enablement requires that the [written
description] teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
59. The scope of the claims must “be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement.”
Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The scope of enablement “is that which is disclosed in the [written description] plus the
scope of what would be known to [a PHOSITA] without undue experimentation.” Id.
60. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 3.04; F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F.
SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 413 (4th ed. 2008).
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Although similar to its statutory cousin, anticipatory enablement
61
is a narrower doctrine. A prior art reference need not demonstrate
62
utility in order to anticipate. And an anticipatory reference need
only enable what falls precisely within the scope of the claim-at-issue
63
and nothing more. By comparison, an enabling description for
patent-supporting purposes must enable the full scope of the claimed
64
subject matter. These differing standards reveal a curious
asymmetry: a description that is sufficient to anticipate a claim for
patent-defeating purposes might be insufficient to enable a claim for
65
patent-supporting purposes.
2. Technical Difficulties. Although the patent statute does not
distinguish between different fields of invention in setting and
66
applying legal standards, technology matters in patent law,
particularly in the enablement context. Determining whether undue
61. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“The standard for what constitutes proper enablement of a prior art reference for purposes of
anticipation under section 102 . . . differs from the enablement standard under section 112.”
(quoting Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
“Enablement” does not appear anywhere within the text of § 102. Thus, the doctrine is the
result of a “judicially imposed limitation” on § 102 that the description of the subject matter in
the reference must be an enabling description. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962);
see also Mueller & Chisum, supra note 31, at 1137–38 (comparing the two forms of enablement).
62. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Rasmusson, 413 F.3d at 1326).
In an earlier case, Judge Rich provided a statutory basis for the distinction, noting that § 112
provides that the written description “must enable [the PHOSITA] to ‘use’ the invention
whereas § 102 makes no such requirement as to an anticipatory disclosure.” In re Hafner, 410
F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Thus, the “double standard” is “implicitly[,] if not explicitly,
required by law.” Id.
63. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
64. See infra note 219.
65. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (recognizing the
distinction); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (same).
66. The patent statute is essentially technology-neutral on its face, although several
commentators argue that it is technology-specific in application. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 59–65 (2009) (describing
how the courts treat industries differently); Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1654 (same);
William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Judicial
Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 323–28 (2007) (same). Congress added a technology-specific
provision to the nonobviousness section of the statute in 1995. Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006)) (addressing
biotechnology patent processes). Interestingly, technological distinctions are prohibited by the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which states that
patent rights shall be “enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 27.1, 108
Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
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experimentation is required to make what is disclosed in the prior art,
and thus whether the reference is enabling, is a fact-intensive
67
inquiry. The discussion in this Section explores the key, interrelated
technical issues: (1) whether the alleged prior art reference includes
working examples of the invention or merely describes it, (2) the
PHOSITA’s knowledge at the time of publication, and (3) the nature
of the technology.
It stands to reason that the enablement analysis should be
straightforward if the prior art reference discloses working examples.
Yet it is more likely that the third-party patentee never physically
68
made the subject matter in question (X). The Federal Circuit has
held that an anticipatory reference need not include actual
69
experimental results. This is because the teachings of the reference
70
must be considered together with the knowledge in the art. The
court has often explained that a reference “need not . . . explain every

67. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 45, at 147–50 (describing what
constitutes undue experimentation). Relevant considerations include the nature of the
invention, the breadth of the claims, the level of predictability of the art, the quantity of
experimentation necessary, the presence or absence of working examples, the amount of
direction presented, the prior art, and the relative skill of those in the art. In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory). For cases
applying the Wands factors in the anticipatory-enablement context, see Impax Labs., Inc. v.
Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
68. For instance, consider again U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991). See supra
60
note 38. While the patent discloses at least one novemdecillion (10 , or one followed by sixty
zeroes) chemical compounds, the patentee only provided working examples for thirty-nine of
them. ’351 Patent cols. 7–133.
69. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding secret tests conducted before the critical date to be irrelevant); see also In re Donohue,
766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sustaining an anticipation rejection for a primary reference
disclosing a compound and other references disclosing sufficient information to make that
compound). This accords with the lack of express requirement in the Patent Act that an
applicant physically reduce an invention to practice before obtaining a patent. See Pfaff v. Wells
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1998) (interpreting the statute).
70. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A] prior art reference must be
‘considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.’” (quoting
In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (C.C.P.A. 1978))); see also In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939
(C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining that the proper test is whether the PHOSITA “could take the
description of the invention in the printed publication and combine it with his own knowledge
of the particular art and from this combination be put in possession of the invention on which a
patent is sought”).
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detail” because the PHOSITA can rely on this knowledge in the art
71
to fill in the gaps omitted from the disclosure.
But gap filling raises several concerns. First, PHOSITAs can
more easily fill gaps in certain fields than in others. A chemist usually
cannot extrapolate from the result of one chemical reaction to predict
how another chemical will react with any reasonable expectation of
72
success because of the unpredictable nature of the art. On the other
hand, inventions in applied technologies like paper-clip making and
rock crushing are often regarded as predictable because they are
73
rooted in well-defined, calculable factors. The PHOSITA has an
74
easier time filling gaps in this latter category.
Second, courts allow the decisionmaker to use additional
references to elucidate the PHOSITA’s knowledge at the time of the
75
asserted prior art reference. At first glance, this recourse to extrinsic
evidence seems to violate the “four corners” rule of anticipation
doctrine, which requires that each and every element of the claimed
76
invention be found in a single prior art document. The Federal

71. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480 (quoting DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
72. In the unpredictable arts, a PHOSITA typically must engage in trial and error to figure
out what works and what does not. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 66, at 115 (explaining that
if the art is uncertain, “the court will be inclined to require greater disclosure to satisfy the
requirements of section 112, and correspondingly to narrow the scope of claims permissible
from any given disclosure”); Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for
Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 458 (1994) (presenting a biotechnology example);
cases cited supra note 46. “In view of the rapid advances in science,” however, it may be that
what is “unpredictable at one point in time may become predictable at a later time.” Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This helps explain why
enablement is a shifting, unstable doctrine. See Holbrook, supra note 31, at 176 (“[E]nablement
doctrine . . . is far from pristine. It is more of a standard than a rule.”).
73. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of
disclosure for an invention involving a “predictable” factor such as a mechanical or electrical
element is less than that required for the unpredictable arts); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 66,
at 115 (explaining that less disclosure is required “[i]f the art is predictable and the PHOSITA
quite skilled”).
74. Nonetheless, elucidating the PHOSITA’s knowledge is a fact-specific inquiry. See supra
note 21. The unpredictable-predictable dichotomy thus is not always dispositive in resolving the
gap-filling question. See supra note 46.
75. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
76. See Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“[A]nticipation requires that the four corners of a single, prior art document describe
every element of the claimed invention . . . .”); supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. One
commentator argues that the Federal Circuit’s broadening of the “four corners” definition of
anticipation has led to conflicts with other patent law doctrines. See Robin Feldman, Rethinking
Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–39 (2005).
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Circuit has in fact emphasized that using the additional reference to
expand the technical content of the asserted prior art reference
77
78
violates the rule and knocks the inquiry out of the novelty realm.
But courts have generally held that the rule is not violated when the
purpose of the additional reference is to educate the decisionmaker in
one of the following ways: (1) to clarify, interpret, or explain the
79
asserted prior art’s teachings; or (2) to show that a PHOSITA could
in fact make a chemical compound (X) even though the asserted prior
80
art reference merely discloses the compound’s name or structure.
Although drawing a line between permissible and impermissible
uses of additional references might be easy for simple technologies
like paper clips, recourse to extrinsic evidence to show enablement
for chemical compounds always poses a high risk of violating the
81
four-corners standard for anticipation.
II. THE NOVELTY PARADOX
A. Assessing Novelty
1. The Current Examination Framework.
In determining
whether chemical compound X is novel, the Patent Office undertakes
82
a three-step analysis. First, the examiner must construe the relevant
83
claim in the patent application to determine its scope. In the case of

77. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (explaining that the role of the additional reference is not “to fill gaps” in the asserted
prior art document), abrogated on other grounds by Abbott Labs v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 727 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (affirming the district court’s findings on anticipation because the accused infringer
sought to use the additional references not to interpret or shed light on the prior art reference,
but to impermissibly supplement its teachings).
78. For a discussion of lack of nonobviousness as an alternative basis for unpatentability,
see infra note 104.
79. See Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1576 (“It is sometimes appropriate to consider extrinsic
evidence to explain the disclosure of a reference.”); see also In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952
F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence may be considered when it is used to
explain, but not expand, the meaning of a reference.”).
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See infra Part II.
82. Courts undertake a similar analysis. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 8 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (D.N.J. 1998) (articulating the three steps), aff’d, 192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
83. See Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he anticipation inquiry first demands a proper claim construction.”). At the prosecution
stage, the examiner must give claim terms the broadest reasonable interpretation a PHOSITA
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X, this tends to be straightforward because the claim’s elements can
84
be easily deduced from the compound’s structure. Second, to check
for strict identity, the examiner must compare the construed claim
with the compound recited in the prior art reference to determine if
85
each claim element is found in it. Third, the examiner must
determine whether the alleged prior art reference was sufficiently
enabling to teach a PHOSITA how to make X without undue
experimentation at that time. If so, X is already in possession of the
86
public.
If the subject matter disclosed in the reference is identical to that
87
which is later claimed by the subsequent inventor, the analysis
essentially reduces to a question of enablement. Whether a prior art
reference is enabling is a question of law based on underlying factual
88
inquiries. On appeal, the question of whether a reference is enabling
is reviewed de novo, and the underlying factual inquiries are reviewed
89
90
deferentially. Whether a reference anticipates is a question of fact.
91
The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)
articulated a burden-shifting framework to handle anticipatory92
enablement issues that arise during patent examination. As a
would give them while simultaneously conferring an interpretation consistent with the
applicant’s written description. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
84. See In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (explaining that “every material
element of the claimed subject matter, the chemical compound, could be found in the primary
reference, a disclosure of that compound”). For a hypothetical example, consider the following:
if the inventor seeks to patent Ni(CO)4, and a third-party patent recites Ni(CO)4 by structure or
chemical name (“nickel tetracarbonyl”), then strict identity is met because the prior art teaches
each and every element of the subject matter (a nickel atom surrounded by four carbonyl
groups).
85. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (“It is axiomatic that for prior art to anticipate under § 102 it has to meet every element of
the claimed invention . . . .”).
86. Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In
re Brown, 329 F.2d 1006, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1964)); see also supra Part I.
87. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
88. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
89. For appeals from the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit reviews the factual
underpinnings for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Appellate courts review lower courts’ factual findings in bench trials for clear error. Impax
Labs., 545 F.3d at 1315.
90. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 812, 814–15 (1869)).
91. The C.C.P.A. was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. See supra note 46.
92. The framework took shape soon after the C.C.P.A.’s adoption of the possession
standard for anticipatory enablement. See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681–82 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(explaining that anticipatory-enablement issues are governed by a burden-shifting regime); In re
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starting point, at the time of filing, § 102 affords the applicant a
presumption of novelty because the statute states that “a person shall
be entitled to a patent unless” one of the statutory exclusions is
93
shown. This means that the examiner has the initial burden of
94
coming forward with evidence of anticipation. The examiner can
make a prima facie case whenever a reference specifically describes X
95
by name or structure. If the allegedly anticipatory reference (the
primary reference) does not describe how to prepare the compound,
the examiner can rely on one or more secondary references to prove
that the PHOSITA was capable of making X at the time of the
96
primary reference. In any event, the examiner can reject the
applicant’s claim to X for anticipation without conducting an inquiry
97
into whether the third-party patent enables the subject matter. Put
98
simply, the third-party patent enjoys a presumption of enablement.
The applicant must rebut this presumption through persuasive
99
argument or proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
asserted third-party patent is nonenabling and therefore insufficient

Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450–52 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (outlining the burden-shifting process for the
anticipatory-enablement inquiry); In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (stating that
the appellants can prevail only if they carry the burden of proof).
93. Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Ex parte Thorne, No. 95-4440, 1999 WL 33204520, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 9,
1999) (reversing the examiner’s rejection under §§ 102 (a) and (b) because the Board was
“constrained” to do so based on the presumption of novelty); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge
Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U.
L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (“If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled to a
patent (because [§ 102 of] the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as patentability can
be determined.”).
94. Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450; accord In re Sun, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“The examiner bears the burden of presenting at least a prima facie case of anticipation.”); In
re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that the Patent Office must establish a
prima facie case before any burden shifting occurs); see also In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that an examiner must affirmatively prove unpatentability); In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the examiner’s initial burden of putting
forth a prima facie case of unpatentability).
95. Wilder, 429 F.2d at 451 (noting that a prima facie case is effectively established
“whenever a reference is shown to contain a disclosure which is specific as to every critical
element of the appealed claims”).
96. See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (explaining that although a
single prior art reference must disclose each and every element of the claimed compound, the
examiner may rely on additional references to show that a PHOSITA had sufficient knowledge
to make it); supra text accompanying notes 75–80.
97. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A 1980)).
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100

to have placed X in possession of the public. Facts suggesting
inoperativeness—such as actual experimental data or affidavits from
101
experts in the field—are often “highly probative.” The examiner
can then submit evidence to rebut the applicant’s contention of
102
nonenablement. The burden of production may continue to shift as
103
each side presents new evidence; however, the examiner carries the
104
ultimate burden of persuasion.
100. According to the Federal Circuit,
In response to the [Patent Office]’s asserted prima facie case the applicant may argue
that the inference of lack of novelty was not properly drawn, for example if the
[Patent Office] did not correctly apply or understand the subject matter of the
reference, or if the [Patent Office] drew unwarranted conclusions therefrom.
However, when the [Patent Office] shows sound basis for believing that the products
of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of
showing that they are not.
In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
101. In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
102. Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681.
103. Id. at 681–82.
104. In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see also In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) (articulating the rule that the Patent Office carries
the burden of persuasion in showing why an applicant should not receive a patent). Absent any
other grounds of unpatentability, the applicant is entitled to the patent. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This raises an interesting question: if the applicant wins on the
novelty rejection, can the examiner rely on lack of nonobviousness (§ 103) as an alternative
basis for unpatentability? Like novelty, nonobviousness is assessed by comparing the claimed
subject matter to the prior art:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in § 102 . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a [PHOSITA] to which said
subject matter pertains . . . .
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). So in contrast to novelty, which asks whether the invention is new,
the nonobviousness inquiry seeks to ascertain whether the invention is “new enough” to be
patented. 2 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 3.01. The facts in In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A.
1968), illustrate a typical scenario. Upon filing a patent application claiming X, the examiner
rejected the claim under § 103 based on a reference that disclosed the structurally similar
compound, X′. Id. at 270–72. Under well-settled law, structurally similar compounds are prima
facie obvious. In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122, 125–26 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (early recognition); In re Dillon,
919 F.2d 688, 692–93 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (collecting cases and reaffirming Hass). In
rebuttal, the applicant (1) proved by affidavit that the cited reference did not teach a PHOSITA
how to make X and (2) pointed out that the examiner did not cite any secondary references that
did so. Hoeksema, 399 F.2d at 271–72. The Board nonetheless affirmed the examiner’s rejection,
contending that a method of making X was only one factor to be considered in the § 103
analysis. Id. at 273. The C.C.P.A. reversed the Board. In accordance with its post–Von Bramer
jurisprudence, the C.C.P.A. held that “if the prior art of record fails to disclose or render
obvious a method for making a claimed compound, at the time the invention was made, it may
not be legally concluded that the compound itself is in the possession of the public.” Id. at 274.
But see In re Mahoney, 411 F.2d 1321, 1323–24, 1325 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (affirming a § 103
rejection because, in contrast to Hoeksema, the examiner proved that there were obvious,
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The Federal Circuit adopted this burden-shifting framework and
105
tweaked it for use in patent litigation. In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
106
the court held that the underlying
Marion Roussel, Inc.,
presumption of enablement encompasses both claimed and
107
unclaimed subject matter in the third-party patent. As support for
its holding, the court explained that the examiner should not bear the
burden of analyzing enablement each time an allegedly anticipating
108
third-party patent is challenged.
2. The Proof Paradox. Although the allocation of burdens and
presumptions may seem evenhanded and fair, a closer look may paint
a very different picture. Consider the hypothetical below, which is
109
based on a leading case.

available processes for making the compound at issue). In sum, an examiner cannot rely on
§ 103 to circumvent the requirement for enabling prior art. As Judge Rich later explained,
[A] reference which merely describes a thing . . . without telling how to make
it . . . [will] not support a holding of anticipation unless a [PHOSITA] could take its
teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in
possession of [it], or [will] not support a holding of obviousness unless there is some
known or obvious way to make the thing . . . .
In re Collins, 462 F.2d 538, 542–43 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (“The test of whether a particular compound described in the prior art may have
been relied upon to show that the claimed subject matter at issue would have been obvious is
whether the prior art provided an enabling disclosure with respect to the disclosed prior art
compound.”). But the prior art as a whole must be enabling, not just a single reference.
Holbrook, supra note 31, at 171–73 (citing Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB,
892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Even if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is
prior art for all that it teaches.”)).
105. In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the
Federal Circuit held that when an accused infringer asserts a prior art patent against the
patentee (as part of an invalidity defense for a lack of novelty), the district court judge may
presume that the subject matter in that patent is enabled. Id. at 1355. Simply put, the accused
infringer need not prove enablement. But “[l]ike the applicant in ex parte prosecution, . . . the
patentee may argue that the relevant claimed or unclaimed disclosures of a prior art patent are
not enabled and therefore are not pertinent prior art.” Id. If the district court finds the
patentee’s evidence of nonenablement persuasive, the court “must then exclude that particular
prior art patent in any anticipation inquiry, for then the presumption has been overcome.” Id.;
see also Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming
a district court’s determination that a prior art patent was nonenabling and thus insufficient to
anticipate the claims of the patent-in-suit).
106. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
107. Id. at 1355. The court also made clear that the presumption of enablement is rooted in
policy and “does not rely on” the statutory presumption of validity afforded to an issued patent
under 35 U.S.C. § 282. Id. at 1355 n.21.
108. Id.
109. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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Suppose that an inventor synthesizes X in 2004 and determines
110
that it exhibits anti-inflammatory activity. In light of this utility, the
inventor decides to file a patent application that year, claiming X. The
examiner rejects the claim as anticipated under § 102(b) by a thirdparty patent that issued in 2000 (primary reference), in which X
111
appears in a voluminous list of compounds. Although X was never
made, the primary reference states that it can be prepared by treating
precursor A with B according to the following reaction:
A+B→X

Although B is commercially available from a chemical supplier,
precursor A is not, and the primary reference is silent about how to
obtain it. To bolster a prima facie case of anticipation, the examiner
cites another third-party patent that issued in 1999 (secondary
reference #1) and that, although not disclosing a method for making
A, teaches that A is a suitable precursor for producing compounds
other than X. Yet the examiner reasons that if A appears in both the
primary reference and secondary reference #1, there must be
sufficient knowledge in the art for a PHOSITA to make it.
In response, the applicant submits a sworn declaration to rebut
112
the examiner’s prima facie case. The declaration states that attempts
to make A by conventional techniques known in the art have failed.
Therefore, the applicant argues, if the primary reference’s teachings
combined with knowledge in the art are nonenabling with respect to
precursor A, then they must also be nonenabling with respect to X.
Thus, the applicant contends that the primary reference is insufficient
for anticipation purposes.
Impliedly conceding that the applicant rebutted the prima facie
case, the examiner asserts an additional reference: a pharmacology
110. Contrary to popular belief, one cannot obtain a patent on a compound simply because
it is novel. It must also be useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a
patent therefor.”), construed in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (holding that a
compound that lacks a known use and thus fails to provide a specific benefit to the public is
unpatentable). Utility is determined as of the applicant’s filing date. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560,
1567 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
111. For a discussion of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as a basis for unpatentability, see supra notes 15,
24 and accompanying text.
112. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2009) (stating that when a claim is rejected, any evidence
submitted by the applicant to overcome the rejection must be by way of oath or declaration).
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textbook published in 1983 (secondary reference #2). Although the
textbook does not specifically mention A, it explains that structurally
similar compounds were successfully made during the previous
decade by following a conventional technique with a catalytic amount
113
of copper. But the textbook also states that success requires careful
calibration of the reaction conditions, which are quite sensitive to the
nature of the starting materials. Nonetheless, the examiner contends
that a PHOSITA has sufficient knowledge and skill to calibrate the
reaction conditions to make A.
The applicant’s contention of nonenablement having been
rebutted, the burden of production shifts back to the applicant. When
the applicant produces no evidence to challenge the textbook, the
114
examiner makes the rejection final. The Board of Patent Appeals
115
and Interferences sustains the examiner’s rejection. In affirming the
Board’s decision, the appellate court finds that the applicant’s
evidence lacks a persuasive factual basis for dismissing the catalytic
route described in the textbook, specifically noting that the
applicant’s declaration does not employ any copper catalyst in the
116
attempted synthesis of precursor A. In the end, the court holds that
the primary reference, in view of secondary reference #2, contains an
117
enabling disclosure that anticipates the applicant’s claim to X.
This hypothetical illustrates the evidentiary problems that an
applicant may face when trying to overcome an allegedly anticipating
reference. First, even if the applicant successfully rebuts the
examiner’s initial prima facie case, the examiner can continue to
assert secondary references to prove that there is sufficient
118
knowledge in the art to make X.

113. A catalyst is a substance (often a metal) that speeds up a reaction. Catalysts are not
consumed during the reaction and are often recovered upon its completion. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 90 (James Trefil ed., 2001).
114. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (stating that on a second or subsequent examination the rejection
may be made final). A rejection is not appealable until it has been made final. 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) (2006).
115. For a discussion of the Board and its procedures, see infra note 142.
116. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681–82 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
117. Id. at 682.
118. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (explaining that the factfinder may look to “any” additional references that establish that
the allegedly anticipatory reference was enabling to a PHOSITA during the relevant time
period, including references that postdate the primary reference).
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Second, attempting to elucidate what the PHOSITA knew at
119
some point in the past introduces hindsight problems. As Professor
Gregory Mandel explains,
[I]ndividuals are not cognitively able to prevent knowledge gained
through hindsight from impacting their analysis of past events.
Rather, individuals routinely overestimate the ex ante predictability
of events after they have occurred. Critical for patent law, once
individuals have hindsight information, they consistently exaggerate
what could have been anticipated in foresight and not only tend to
view what has occurred as having been inevitable, but also as having
120
appeared relatively inevitable beforehand.

In the enablement context, “[h]indsight bias . . . normally lead[s]
factfinders to overestimate the level of skill in the art, since
subsequent advances . . . suggest that the invention could not have
121
been that difficult to do.”
Third, the hypothetical reveals that in order to overcome the
rejection, the applicant probably needed experimental proof that the

119. Though tempting, hindsight reasoning is impermissible in both novelty (35 U.S.C.
§ 102) and nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) analyses. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (cautioning factfinders to be aware of hindsight bias and its reliance on ex
post reasoning); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (discussing the need to “guard
against slipping into use of hindsight” (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. &
Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (1964)); In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 974 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (warning
against “hindsight anticipation[],” in which the applicant’s disclosure is used as a guide to dissect
and recombine references to describe specific compounds within the meaning of § 102); In re
Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 690–91 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining the court’s unwillingness to substitute
speculation and hindsight appraisal of the prior art for factual evidence of nonobviousness). It is
important to note that Ruschig-type “hindsight anticipation” is inapposite when a compound is
specifically recited by name or structure. See Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of
DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV. 975, 1000 (2006) (exploring anticipation issues that can arise
when the asserted prior art reference discloses a voluminous list of compounds). Nonetheless,
hindsight problems might arise when the examiner is allowed to pick and choose among
documents to describe what the PHOSITA knew in the past.
120. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1402 (2006) (citing
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)).
121. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1199 (2002); see also R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent
Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 205 (2002) (“[In considering]
enablement, which is measured through the lens of the knowledge of the relevant field as of the
filing date of the patent application[, a]s the filing date becomes distant, the potential for
cognitive biases, such as a hindsight bias, increases.” (footnote omitted)).
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conventional technique did not work with an added copper catalyst.
An applicant may thus need to engage in actual experimentation to
prove that an allegedly anticipatory reference is nonenabling. Herein
lies a major paradox: A bedrock principle of patent law is that an
inventor need not engage in any actual experimentation before
123
obtaining a patent. So it seems odd that an inventor, who is not
required to physically reduce X to practice in order to prove § 112
enablement, may have to engage in experimentation to prove that a
reference is nonenabling. Savvy third-party patentees accordingly
have an incentive to purposely create novelty hurdles for subsequent
inventors by strategically disclosing unclaimed, unmade compounds
124
in their patents.

122. See Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681–82 (“It was incumbent upon appellants to rebut the
presumed operability of the copper catalyst method described in [the organic textbook]. As did
the [B]oard, we find the Sasse declaration devoid of any persuasive factual bases for dismissing
the proposed catalytic synthesis. Sasse does not employ any copper catalyst in the attempted
preparation of the precursors.” (emphasis added)).
123. It is well settled in U.S. patent law that conception, and not any physical act, is the key
facet of the inventive process. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1999) (“[T]he
word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather
than to a physical embodiment of that idea.”); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40
F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[c]onception is the touchstone of
inventorship,” which only requires “‘the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention’” (quoting Hybritech Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986))). Thus, an applicant who
“constructively” reduces an invention to practice by merely filing a patent application
presumably has complied with the disclosure requirements of § 112, including the obligation to
enable a PHOSITA to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. Hybritech
Inc., 802 F.2d at 1376.
There may be occasions, however, when an actual reduction to practice is a de facto
requirement. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 646–52. For example, several
cases suggest that an applicant must supply actual experimental data for inventions in
unpredictable technologies in the early stages of development or when an applicant purports to
invent something that is contrary to well-settled scientific principles. Id.
124. A document that specifically names thousands or millions of chemical compounds is
referred to as a “shotgun” reference. In re Schoenewaldt, 343 F.2d 1000, 1002 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
Yet a shotgun reference can potentially anticipate each recited compound if the disclosure is
sufficiently enabling. See infra note 192.
There are at least five reasons why a patentee would disclose subject matter but not
claim it. First, a third party may intentionally disclose unclaimed material to create novelty
problems for subsequent inventors. Second, it could be an unintentional error. See Michael J.
Meuer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective
on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1951–52 (2005) (explaining that an applicant’s
ability to claim everything the applicant has enabled depends on the talent and effort of the
inventor and patent prosecutor in identifying what has been enabled). Third, because the
written description places an outer limit on claim scope, Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999), one way to avoid § 112, ¶ 1, issues is
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Fourth, given that the third-party patentee does not claim X, one
might ask why is it reasonable to presume that the disclosed process
for making it (A + B → X) will work. The key point here is that the
Patent Office does not conduct a § 112 enablement analysis on
125
unclaimed subject matter disclosed in an application. That subject
126
matter is simply dedicated to the public. Thus, disclosing unclaimed
subject matter is an excellent “defensive disclosure” strategy to
127
thwart subsequent patent applicants. For example:
[A third-party patentee] could . . . generate millions upon millions of
plausible chemical structures and load them into multiple patent
applications together with one compound that actually meets all of

to draft a disclosure that is broader than the claims. Fourth, the applicant could strategically
craft narrow claims to avoid scrutiny by the Patent Office during prosecution and then, after
issuance, rely on the broad disclosure to enlarge the scope of the claims in litigation. See
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing this
strategy). This tactic has been severely limited by the disclosure-dedication rule. See PSC
Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining
that the disclosure-dedication rule should “motivate patentees to draw the broadest claims that
they consider to be patentable, and to submit the broad claims to the [Patent Office] for
examination”); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is
dedicated to the public). Fifth, an applicant may want to use continuation practice to gain
advantages over competitors. See infra note 232.
125. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.08 (8th ed., rev. 8, 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (“All
questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject matter.”); see also Engel
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Unclaimed subject matter
is not subject to the disclosure requirements of § 112; the reasons are pragmatic: the disclosure
would be boundless, and the pitfalls endless.”).
126. Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) (“[T]he claim of a specific
device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the
face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed.”); Johnson
& Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1054 (“[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject
matter . . . this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.”). This practice may
trigger the disclosure-dedication rule, which bars a finding of patent infringement when an
accused infringer practices disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. See supra note 124.
127. STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 24 (2003), available at http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook/handbook.pdf.
Defensive disclosure is “information or documentation intentionally made available to the
public as prior art in order to render any subsequent claims of invention or discovery ineligible
for a patent.” Id. Several commentators have explored the strategy of defensive publication.
See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2175–76 (2000) (discussing a competitor’s strategic incentive to
create prior art); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000)
(same); sources cited infra notes 128–29.

SEYMORE IN FINAL.DOC

946

12/29/2010 5:30:42 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:919

the patentability [requirements] in each patent application. The
applicant could then claim that enabled compound and get a patent
issued on that compound and have the rest of the [disclosed but
128
unclaimed] structures become enabled prior art . . . .

As one commentator explains, “This is a ‘spoiler’ tactic—you disclose
your technology without pursuing patent protection for yourself just
129
to be sure that no one else can have a patent for it either.”
B. The Quintessential Novelty Problem
1. What Is It? Several patent doctrines, including anticipatory
enablement, emerged during the first century of the U.S. patent
130
system, when inventions were still primarily mechanical devices.
The invention landscape changed around the time of World War II,
when key breakthroughs in antibiotic, vitamin, and hormone research
131
spawned the “therapeutic revolution” and led to the discovery of
132
During this period,
many first-generation “wonder drugs.”
128. CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE TO PATENT
LAW 170 n.4 (2010); see also Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the
Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173, 175 (2005) (“[These] disclosures are designed to preempt
patents in instances where the disclosing firm does not itself plan to pursue patent protection
but fears that its rivals might.”); Bill Barrett, Defensive Use of Publications in an Intellectual
Property Strategy, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 191, 191–93 (2002) (providing strategies for drafting
patent disclosures in unpredictable fields); infra note 161.
129. Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING CREATIVITY
FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003).
130. See John Hoxie, A Patent Attorney’s View, 47 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 630,
636 (1965) (exploring the evolution of inventions from being mostly electrical-mechanical to
chemical in nature); William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263,
263–64 (1990) (same); supra note 54. Quite curiously, the first patent granted in the United
States was for an improved method for making potash (potassium carbonate), America’s first
industrial chemical. See U.S. Patent No. X1 (issued July 31, 1790).
131. NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 7–11 (1983); Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need
for Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 365–66 (1991) (describing the pharmaceutical industrial
revolution).
132. See, e.g., Process for Obtaining Vitamins, U.S. Patent No. 2,049,988 (issued Aug. 4,
1936) (Vitamin B1; assigned to Research Corporation); Alloxazines and Isoalloxazines and
Processes for Their Production, U.S. Patent No. 2,261,608 (issued Nov. 4, 1941) (Vitamin B2;
assigned to Merck); Process of Treating Pregnene Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 2,462,133
(issued Feb. 22, 1949) (synthesis of cortisone; assigned to Merck). Interestingly, the familiar
wonder drugs sulfanilamide (the first sulfa drug) and penicillin were unpatentable (for a lack of
novelty) by the time their therapeutic properties came to light because the substances were
already in the public domain. See Ronald Bentley, Different Roads to Discovery; Prontosil
(Hence Sulfa Drugs) and Penicillin (Hence β-Lactams), 36 J. INDUS. MICROBIOLOGY &
BIOTECH. 775, 775–86 (2009).
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pharmaceutical companies quickly switched from a manufacturing to
a research-based model and secured patents that allowed them to
133
dominate sectors of specific therapeutic markets. This, in turn,
quickly forced the Patent Office and the courts to wrestle with fields
134
key to drug research, like organic chemistry. But the courts did so,
at least initially, by rigidly applying mechanical-electrical patent
135
doctrine to these unpredictable fields. This shoehorning led to

133. See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, supra note 131, at 7–11; Peter Drahos & John
Braithwaite, Intellectual Property, Corporate Strategy, Globalization: TRIPS in Context, 20 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 451, 463–64 (2002) (explaining that during this era drug companies found patent
protection vital because they knew that “[p]enicillin, which had not been patented, had gone
from costing $3,955 per pound in 1945 to $282 per pound in 1950”); Peter Temin, Technology,
Regulation, and Market Structure in the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 429,
436 (1979) (describing the transformation of the pharmaceutical industry from a production to a
research model).
134. See Noonan, supra note 130, at 263–69. The “antibiotic revolution” presents an
interesting story. Given penicillin’s success and the potential for antibiotics to generate
unprecedented profits, pharmaceutical companies sought other antibiotics by screening
potential antibiotic-producing microorganisms from nature. GRAHAM DUTFIELD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 141–42 (2d ed. 2009). But “it was uncertain if the patent system and the courts could
deliver [the blanket patent protection] they wanted” because the compounds were essentially
“gifts of nature” and thus evinced very little inventive creativity. Id. at 142. Professor William
Kingston describes how the pharmaceutical industry took quick action:
The previous [Patent Act] dated from 1870, and did not suit the new methods of
research needed for antibiotics . . . . On behalf of their pharmaceutical industry
clients, New York Patent Bar Association members drafted a Bill and were able to
get it introduced in Congress, and this, supplemented by other Bills and pressures,
brought about the changes they wanted.
William Kingston, Removing Some Harm from the World Trade Organization, 32 OXFORD
DEV. STUD. 309, 310 (2004). The basic change was the incorporation of language in the
nonobviousness provision of the 1952 Patent Act, see Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593,
§ 1, 66 Stat. 792, 792, 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.) (“Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”), tailored to keep the innovation
threshold rather low. DUTFIELD, supra, at 142.
135. See Hoxie, supra note 130, at 636 (explaining how the judiciary tried to fit chemical
inventions into the mold of mechanical-electrical inventions and contending that the judiciary’s
interpretation of the patent statute did not change even as chemical inventions became more
frequent). The courts quickly developed a bias against patent applications involving biological
systems and pharmaceutical compounds. See Noonan, supra note 130, at 263–69. As an example,
consider streptomycin, another first-generation wonder drug that is (like penicillin) a moldproduced antibiotic. Historically, purified natural products were not always patentable. See Am.
Wood-Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593–94 (1874) (holding that
purified cellulose was unpatentable although the process for obtaining it might be). Yet, in 1948,
the Patent Office granted Merck a patent for streptomycin because the chemical modifications
allowing it to be purified created a new composition of matter. See Complex Salts of
Streptomycin and Process for Preparing Same, U.S. Patent No. 2,446,102 cols. 2.4–.8 (issued July
27, 1948) (“[F]or the first time streptomycin is available in a form which not only has valuable
therapeutic properties but also can be produced, distributed, and administered in a practicable
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nonsensical outcomes and a disconnect between the judicial bench
136
and the laboratory bench. And although a body of “unpredictable
art” jurisprudence slowly developed to bridge the disconnect, several
137
issues remain unsettled.
Perhaps the most important unresolved issue is whether and
under what circumstances the appearance of a chemical name or
structure in the prior art anticipates a subsequent inventor’s claim for
the compound. Consider the hypothetical posed earlier: An inventor
who files a patent application claiming compound X is faced with a
third party’s prior patent that recites the structure of X (or includes it
138
within a very small genus of compounds) but says little else about
way.”); cf. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911)
(upholding a patent for a purified adrenaline salt because removing it from gland tissue
produced a new composition of matter), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912). The streptomycin patent was an important legal development because “it
clarified to the industry that the new antibiotics were patentable despite being ‘products of
nature.’” GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 300 (2008).
136. The law of patents as applied to the experimental sciences has been described as “a
child (or orphan) of mechanical patent law.” Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical
Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 768, 783 (1969).
137. See, e.g., Jackie Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Sciences and the Determination of Conception in Patent Law, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 687, 719–21 (1995) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should adopt a
standard of invention tailored to meet the needs of unpredictable activities like drug discovery).
138. It is well settled that the disclosure of a small genus may be sufficient to anticipate a
species, even if the species is not specifically recited. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue
Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The test is if a PHOSITA can “at once
envisage” each member of the limited class of compounds. In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681
(C.C.P.A. 1962). For example, suppose X is a salt with the formula Na4Fe(CN)5F. The examiner
finds a third-party patent that discloses “a salt with the formula Na4Fe(CN)5(halide).” Given
that a PHOSITA (or anyone who has taken a general chemistry course) knows that there are
only five halides (F, Cl, Br, I, At), the disclosure almost certainly meets the Petering test. In
other words, the third-party patent “has described to [the PHOSITA] each of the various
premutations [sic] . . . involved as fully as if [the patentee] had drawn each structural formula or
had written each [by] name.” Id. at 682. Thus, if the disclosure is enabling, the third-party patent
might be sufficient to anticipate a subsequent claim to X, even though X is not specifically
recited. But just because the genus is small (as in the case of the halides) does not mean that
enablement of one member of the group is always sufficient to enable the others. For an
example explaining that, because the other halides require different reaction protocols, the
general method used to prepare aryl chlorides and aryl bromides from diazonium salts and
copper does not work for them, see MICHAEL B. SMITH & JERRY MARCH, MARCH’S
ADVANCED ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 984 (6th ed. 2007).
The case of In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1938), also illustrates this point. The
applicant attempted to claim the product and process of reacting a butadiene moiety with a
hydrogen halide. Id. at 623. The written description disclosed the reaction of natural rubber
(which contains a butadiene moiety) with hydrogen fluoride. Id. at 624. After noting that the
application dealt with an obscure and complex reaction, the examiner rejected several broad
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139

it. Because the structure recited in the prior art and the one claimed
in the patent application are identical, the key question in the novelty
analysis is not one of strict identity but one of enablement: whether
the teachings of the prior patent, together with the PHOSITA’s
knowledge at that time, were sufficient to place X in possession of the
140
public. Although the Patent Office and the courts began grappling
141
with this issue during the earliest days of the chemical era, it is one
142
that inventors aggressively fight today. And so it is, at least within
the realm of the unpredictable arts, the quintessential novelty
problem.
2. Exacerbation.
The judiciary’s early response to the
quintessential novelty problem revealed its unfamiliarity and
discomfort with complex technologies. And somewhat clumsy
reasoning in an early decision only exacerbated the problem. In the
143
1942 case In re Von Bramer, the Patent Office rejected a claim to X
because it appeared in a voluminous list of compounds recited in a
third-party patent. On appeal, Von Bramer argued that an
anticipatory reference must disclose “a sufficient number of [X’s]
physical and chemical attributes” or, alternatively, a process that

claims for nonenablement because “no implied or direct statements can be found in the
application, as originally filed, that the other hydrogen halides will react similarly to give the
same product.” Id. The applicant contended that the disclosure of one member of a well-known
small group was sufficient to enable claims covering the entire group. Id. The court affirmed the
Board’s rejection, explaining that “[c]ertain members of a well-defined group of chemicals may
be equivalents for one purpose and not equivalents for another. Experimentation is required to
ascertain the particular action of a member of the group upon the particular material to be
treated.” Id. at 625 (emphasis added). Applying Soll to the hypothetical presented above, even
if the third-party patent were to disclose a method for making, for example, Na4Fe(CN)5I, it
would not necessarily enable a method for making Na4Fe(CN)5F.
139. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See infra Part II.B.2.
142. See, e.g., In re ’639 Patent Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 157, 172–87 (D. Mass. 2001)
(determining that the claims of a patent that recited a compound were invalid due to
anticipation by a prior art reference), aff’d, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Copley Pharm., Inc.,
45 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ex parte Nicolaou, No. 2007-1076, 2007 WL 3408644, at *4
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 13, 2007) (reversing an examiner’s rejection of claims to compounds because the
prior art’s disclosure was nonenabling). In its appellate role, the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences reviews adverse decisions of examiners. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006). An applicant
whose claims have been twice rejected by the examiner may appeal to the Board. Id. § 134(a).
The Board can affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.197 (2009) (promulgating Patent Office regulations pertaining to the Board). An applicant
dissatisfied with a Board decision can appeal to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).
143. In re Von Bramer, 127 F.2d 149 (C.C.P.A. 1942).
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144

unquestionably produces it. The C.C.P.A. disagreed and held that a
reference depicting the name or structure of X was sufficient to
anticipate a subsequent claim to it even if the reference did not
145
disclose an operative process for making the compound. Although it
cited a nineteenth-century Supreme Court patent case to support its
146
holding,
the Von Bramer court notably failed to mention
enablement or to explicitly discuss what was known in the art at the
147
time of the third-party patent. And regardless of what the court
148
meant to say, the holding and dicta quickly morphed into the “Von
Bramer doctrine,” which held that “the mere name [of a compound,]
149
without more[,] anticipates.”
Even if the C.C.P.A. felt that Von Bramer had been misread,
subsequent opinions addressing the quintessential novelty problem
did not immediately bear this out. To the contrary, the court cited the
150
doctrine as doctrine and even expanded its breadth. For instance, in

144. Id. at 152. Thirty-six years later, Judge Baldwin made a similar argument: “A
compound is described by a reference, in my view, if the reference recites the structure and
recites or reliably and accurately predicts at least one significant property of the
compound. . . . I would treat the actual existence of the compound as legally equivalent to such a
significant property.” In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 564 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
145. Von Bramer, 127 F.2d at 151.
146. See Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 377 (1876) (“It is quite immaterial, even if it
be a fact, that the [third-party patent’s disclosure] is insufficient to teach a manufacturer how to
make the patented corset. It is enough if it sufficiently describes the corset itself.”). For further
discussion of this case, see supra note 54. In contrast to corset making, organic chemistry is an
unpredictable art. See supra note 46. Nonetheless, it appears that the Von Bramer court may
have taken dictum in Cohn out of context. See Von Bramer, 127 F.2d at 152 (citing Cohn for the
proposition that “[i]t is not necessary that a reference patent for a device or chemical compound
disclose an operative process for producing the article or product”).
147. Twenty years later, the C.C.P.A. explained that a consideration of knowledge in the art
was “implicit” in the Von Bramer opinion. See In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 942 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
(stating that there is an assumption that a PHOSITA will use his knowledge in combination
with the printed materials).
148. The opinion included an excerpt from the examiner’s correspondence, which stated
that the compound-at-issue “ha[s] generally predictable properties such as found for any similar
N-alkyl amino phenol, and is generally capable of synthesis by the recognized classical organic
reactions.” Von Bramer, 127 F.2d at 152. Two decades later, Judge Jackson (the author of the
Von Bramer opinion) stated that this so-called predictability was a relevant consideration.
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Ladd, 219 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D.D.C. 1963); accord In re Brown, 329 F.2d
1006, 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (suggesting that predictability should be considered in evaluation of
claims). But trying to classify organic synthesis as predictable, even for compounds within the
same class, can be problematic. See supra note 46.
149. Donald G. Daus, Chemical Names as Anticipation and Support, 70 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 377, 381 (1988).
150. See In re Stoll, 161 F.2d 241, 243 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (“A compound previously described
by name in a printed publication such as an issued patent is a disclosure which is sufficient to
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a 1956 case in which an applicant submitted proof that the third
party’s method for making X did not work, the C.C.P.A. held that
“[i]t is well settled . . . that a reference which clearly names a
compound or identifies it by structural formula constitutes a full
anticipation of a claim to that compound, even though the reference
contains only an inoperative method for producing the compound, or
151
no method at all.”
Although commentators immediately argued that Von Bramer
152
had been read out of context, the Patent Office took the absolute
position that the mere recitation of X by name or structure in a
reference, even if done by accident or typographical error, served as a
153
complete anticipation. And if the reference lacked an operative
method for making X, whether a PHOSITA could rely on knowledge
154
in the art to make it was seemingly immaterial.
Twenty years elapsed before the C.C.P.A. attempted to put the
155
Von Bramer doctrine to rest. The decision to abandon the doctrine
support the rejection of a claim for that compound.”); In re Crosley, 159 F.2d 735, 736 (C.C.P.A.
1947) (“Furthermore, this court is committed to the doctrine that where a product is clearly
disclosed in a publication, the operativeness of any of the processes by which it is claimed the
product could be produced is immaterial, and that the disclosure of the composition is sufficient
to anticipate a claim therefor.”); see also Daus, supra note 149, at 381–83 (tracing the
development of the doctrine); Maurice W. Levy, Von Bramer: A Plea for Reorientation, 33 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 401, 401–27 (1951) (same).
151. In re Baranauckas, 228 F.2d 413, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
152. See Daus, supra note 149, at 382–83 (arguing that Von Bramer was “carried to
extremes”); Levy, supra note 150, at 401 (arguing that the Von Bramer doctrine evolved from
reading dicta out of context).
153. See WEGNER, supra note 38, § 129, at 173–74 (explaining that misprints naming a
particular structure were sufficient to anticipate); Levy, supra note 150, at 401–03 (collecting
cases and suggesting that examiners felt constrained to make this type of rejection even if it was
substantively unsound).
154. Levy, supra note 150, at 402. For example, see Ex Parte Nagy, 106 U.S.P.Q. 424, 425
(P.T.O. Bd. App. 1955) (holding that a compound recited in the prior art was sufficient to
anticipate even though the prior art method of preparation failed).
155. In re Brown, 329 F.2d 1006, 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (“To the extent that anyone may
draw an inference from the Von Bramer case that the mere printed conception . . . of a
‘compound’ is sufficient to show that [it] is old [for § 102 or § 103 purposes], we totally
disagree.”); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 942 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that the court disagrees
with any case, including Von Bramer, that conflicts with Cohn). Why did the C.C.P.A. change its
mind? It may have done so due to several substantial enhancements to the court’s technical
competence. First, the addition of Judges Giles Rich and Arthur Smith (author of LeGrice) in
the 1950s brought technical astuteness and patent expertise to the court. See GILES S. RICH, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 131–33,
143–44 (1980) (discussing the appointments of Judges Rich and Smith to the C.C.P.A. and
describing each of these judges’ professional backgrounds). Second, in 1955, Judge Eugene
Worley (later Chief Judge) argued that each judge on the C.C.P.A. should have a technical
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was due in no small part to the wisdom of Judge Giles S. Rich, co156
drafter of the 1952 Patent Act. He wrote in In re Papesch that a
formula does not describe a compound:
From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its
properties are inseparable; they are one and the same thing. The
graphic formulae, the chemical nomenclature, [and] the systems of
classification . . . are mere symbols by which compounds can be
identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a
compound[,] and while it may serve in a claim to identify what is
being patented, as the metes and bounds of a deed identify a plot of
land, the thing that is patented is not the formula but the compound
157
identified by it.
158

Guided by this reasoning, the C.C.P.A. held in In re Wiggins that
merely naming a compound in a reference, without more, is
inadequate to describe it because the mere recitation “constitute[s]
nothing more than speculation about [its] potential or theoretical
159
existence.” Judge Almond explained what would happen if the
court were to hold otherwise:
[L]ists of thousands of theoretically possible compounds could be
generated and published which, assuming it would be within the
level of skill in the art to make them, would bar a patent to the
actual discoverer of a named compound no matter how beneficial to
mankind it might be. In view of the fact that the purpose sought to
be effectuated by the patent law is the encouragement of innovation,
160
such a result would be repugnant to the statute.

advisor to assist in patent cases. Id. at 118–19. He envisioned a group of advisors “thoroughly
skilled in the advanced fields of electronics, chemistry, and related sciences” to assist with the
“increasing volume and technicalities” of the court’s patent docket. Id. at 119. Although Judge
Worley initially faced resistance from his colleagues, the court hired its first technical advisor,
the (former) Solicitor of the Patent Office, that same year. Id. at 118–19. Eventually the
C.C.P.A. judges began a tradition of hiring technically trained law clerks, giving the court “a
considerable pool of technological assistance” that was kept fresh because newer clerks had
“the latest training in their respective fields.” Id. at 121.
156. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
157. Id. at 391 (first emphasis added); cf. Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d
1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Indeed, a chemical structure is simply a means of describing a
compound; it is not the invention itself.”).
158. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
159. Id. at 543; cf. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir. 1942)
(“[A]nother’s experiment, imperfect and never perfected, will not serve either as an anticipation
or as part of the prior art, for it has not served to enrich it.”).
160. Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 543.
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But despite efforts to put Von Bramer to rest, the case had
already left its mark on patent law. It opened the door for third
parties to pad the patent literature with voluminous lists of unmade
compounds to hinder bona fide claims to those compounds down the
161
road. And Von Bramer planted a seed in patent jurisprudence that
blossomed into the notion that a PHOSITA can figure out how to
162
make a compound just from knowing something about its structure.
3. Unresolved Issues. The courts now use the enablement163
possession test to handle the quintessential novelty problem.
Although this test is substantively better than the harsh Von Bramer
doctrine, there are still unresolved issues. Dividing the post–Von
Bramer cases into two categories helps to unpack the lingering issues
and to shed light on the problems they cause for subsequent
inventors.
The first category addresses situations in which the allegedly
anticipatory reference discloses an unsuccessful attempt to make X.
164
In In re Sheppard and In re Wiggins, the C.C.P.A. held that such a
reference is insufficient to anticipate, particularly if there is no
evidence of record that a PHOSITA could make X at the time of the
165
reference. More recently, the Federal Circuit relied on Sheppard
and Wiggins to craft a per se rule that a reference describing an
166
experimental failure is nonenabling.
161. Interestingly, the court hinted at this problem during the Von Bramer era:
At the same time, however, though our decision is compelled by the existing law, we
feel constrained to point out that there are limits to the [Von Bramer]
doctrine . . . . What the precise boundary lines are, we are unable now to discern.
Certainly they do not extend so far as to permit publication of theoretical lists of
hundreds or thousands of possible compounds to deny patent protection on such
compounds to those who actually discovered them later. The exact boundaries will
have to be delineated on a case by case basis.
In re Baranauckas, 228 F.2d 413, 416 (C.C.P.A. 1956). For a discussion of defensive publication,
see supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See supra Part I.B.
164. In re Sheppard, 339 F.2d 238 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
165. Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 542–44 (explaining that although the reference described X by
name, its failed synthesis, plus the lack of evidence that a PHOSITA could make it at that time,
made the reference nonenabling); Sheppard, 339 F.2d at 241 (explaining that X’s decomposition
during synthesis created uncertainty about the reference’s teaching and thus made the
disclosure nonenabling). Neither opinion cites United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1996), in
which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[a]n inoperable invention or one which fails to
achieve its intended result does not negative novelty.” Id. at 50 (citing Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S.
1, 17 (1935)).
166. See infra note 177.
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The second category includes those situations in which X appears
in an allegedly anticipatory reference (the primary reference) with no
intrinsic synthetic details. In other words, the primary reference
either does not disclose an attempt to make X or states that X can be
made from general methods known in the art. Interestingly, In re
167
Samour and subsequent cases make clear that the examiner may
rely on one or more secondary references to prove that the
PHOSITA was capable of making X at the time of the primary
168
reference. Although this may raise concerns about the single169
reference rule required for anticipation, reliance on secondary
references does not transform the inquiry into one concerning
170
nonobviousness, the lack of which can be established by combining
171
the teachings of multiple prior art references. In sum, a primary
reference that merely recites X’s structure satisfies strict identity,
whereas the secondary reference, by showing that there is sufficient
172
knowledge in the art to make X, shows possession. So, in a sense,
“[a] reference that was not enabling upon its publication can become
167. In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
168. See Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing
the “modest flexibility” in the single-reference rule that allows a secondary reference to
accommodate situations in which the PHOSITA’s knowledge cannot be gleaned from the
primary reference); In re Donahue, 766 F.2d 531, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying Samour to
affirm a Patent Office multiple-reference rejection for a lack of novelty); Studiengesellschaft
Kohle, M.B.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 726–27 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the
“caveat” to the single-reference rule); Samour, 571 F.2d at 562–63 (explaining that while a single
prior art reference must disclose each and every element of the claimed compound, the
examiner may rely on additional references to show that a PHOSITA had sufficient knowledge
to make it). The secondary reference can even postdate the primary reference. See Samour, 571
F.2d at 563 (explaining that the relevant inquiry is whether the compound was already in
possession of the public more than one year prior to the applicant’s filing date under § 102(b)
and not whether evidence showing such possession came before or after the date of the primary
reference).
169. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
170. Lack of novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102) and lack of nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) are
substantively distinct grounds for denying patentability. Most would agree that nonobviousness
only comes into play after the novelty inquiry is complete. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (explaining that an applicant must “hav[e] separate keys to open in succession
the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103”) (emphasis added)), aff’d in relevant part sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
171. For novelty, all of the claim elements are found within the primary reference. Samour,
571 F.2d at 563. By contrast, obviousness is often shown when the claim elements are found
across multiple references. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1363–64
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the distinction). Nonetheless, the prior art used for a
nonobviousness rejection must also be enabling. See discussion supra note 104.
172. In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (discussing Samour and how its
holding still comports with the single-reference rule).
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enabling and therefore an anticipation at a later time when additional
173
[references] become[] available.”
174
A good illustration of this second scenario is In re Donahue.
There, the allegedly anticipatory reference was a 1970 journal article
that recited the structure of X but did not explain how to make it. The
examiner rejected Donahue’s claim to X, contending that secondary
sources, including a third-party patent that issued in 1975, showed
that a PHOSITA could have relied on knowledge in the art to make
175
X in 1970. In affirming the rejection, the Federal Circuit explained
that the use of secondary references to show the level of skill in the
art is not inconsistent with the general rule that each element of a
176
claim must be found in a single prior art document.
Having explained the two types of cases, it is now possible to
explore several problems with the current regime. First, given that the
disclosure of an unsuccessful attempt to synthesize X makes a
177
reference insufficient to anticipate, third parties have a strong
incentive to conceal experimental failures so as to maximize the
document’s novelty-defeating potential. This is because a reference’s
silence with respect to an attempt to make X “does not indicate one
178
way or the other” whether it is enabling.
The problem here is that disclosing experimental failure is good
for both scientific progress and the innovation-related goals of the
179
patent system. At minimum, the disclosure saves time and money

173. Chisum, supra note 31, at 63 (emphasis added).
174. In re Donahue, 766 F.2d 531 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
175. Id. at 532.
176. Id. at 534.
177. In attempting to distinguish Donahue from the Sheppard-Wiggins scenario, the Federal
Circuit stated,
In those cases, the references were deemed insufficient, because they stated that
attempts to prepare the claimed compounds were unsuccessful. Such failures by those
skilled in the art (having possession of the information disclosed by the publication)
are strong evidence that the disclosure of the publication was nonenabling.
Id. at 533; see also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that a failed experiment reported in a third-party patent makes it irrelevant as a prior
art reference).
178. See Donahue, 766 F.2d at 533 (“By contrast, the fact that the author of a publication did
not attempt to make his disclosed invention does not indicate one way or the other whether the
publication would have been enabling.”).
179. See, e.g., GERARD H. GAYNOR, INNOVATION BY DESIGN 140 (2002) (observing that
experimental failure is part of the innovative process and that lessons can be learned from it);
ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT 213 (1990) (“Innovation . . . requires experimental failure to
achieve success.”).
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by preventing the repetition of dead-end experiments. There is
indeed hope that reading the details of the failed experiment will
181
induce innovative thinking to solve that specific problem or others.
In sum, disclosing experimental failures is something that the patent
system should encourage.
Second, it is not immediately clear why experimental failure
should be dispositive on the enablement issue because the cases make
clear that the PHOSITA’s knowledge is also important. Consider In
182
re Jacobs, in which the applicant argued that a third-party patent
should be insufficient to anticipate because the disclosed process for
183
making X did not work. Affirming the rejection, the C.C.P.A.
explained that “[i]n order for appellants to prevail, and in view of the
[third-party patent’s] disclosure, we think that appellants have the
burden of proving that [the disclosed] process was not operative to
produce [X] and could not be made operative by use of ordinary skill
184
of the art.” Thus, the PHOSITA may have sufficient knowledge to

180. FREDERICK GRINNELL, EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF SCIENCE 9 (2009). As one
commentator notes,
Physical scientists often publish their failed experiments. Though not as satisfying
as successful ones, certain failures give information that is truly useful. If nothing else,
a well-documented failure says, “You don’t have to bother with this technique. It
doesn’t work, at least not . . . the way I tried it.” . . . [Thus p]hysical scientists, in
publishing their failures, help their brethren . . . .
BRUCE JACKSON, FIELDWORK 14 (1987).
181. See ALAN AXELROD, EDISON ON INNOVATION 40–42 (2008) (describing Thomas
Edison’s view that failed experiments always provide useful information and thus are not really
failures at all); DOROTHY LEONARD-BARTON, WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE 119–20 (1998)
(exploring the role of failed experiments in knowledge building); STEFAN H. THOMKE,
EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR
INNOVATION 23 (2003) (“Innovators learn from failure . . . . [K]nowledge of either failure or
success itself can be stockpiled, providing a resource that, if not applicable to one set of
experiments, can be used for subsequent inquiries.”). Failed experiments can lead to accidental
discoveries, thereby converting failure into success. See LEONARD-BARTON, supra, at 120
(recounting the story of penicillin); Seymore, Serendipity, supra note 45, at 192–211 (exploring
the role of accidental discoveries in patent law).
182. In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
183. See id. at 745 (“[A]ppellants’ argument in effect is that the disclosure in the Miller
patent is inoperable to produce [X] and hence in error.”). The applicant’s argument that the
disclosed method did not work raises an interesting technical question. As one commentator
explains, “It is all too easy for a skilled person to say that he tried, but failed, to prepare a prior
art compound, but is that because his task was impossible or because he performed the task
incompetently, or at least not so competently as other skilled workers might do?” White, supra
note 31, at 318.
184. Jacobs, 318 F.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
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make X even if the process disclosed in the third-party patent fails.
So it is somewhat curious that the Federal Circuit has drawn such a
sharp distinction between the Sheppard-Wiggins and SamourDonahue scenarios.
Third, contrary to the strong language used in Wiggins, it appears
that a third-party patent’s mere recitation of X by name or structure
is, as a practical matter, sufficient to anticipate a subsequent
inventor’s claim to the compound. Why is this so? To begin, the mere
appearance of X in the third-party patent meets novelty’s strictidentity requirement in that it discloses each and every element of the
186
subject matter to be claimed (X). Even if the primary reference
provides no experimental details, all the examiner has to do is
assemble secondary references that suggest that the PHOSITA was
capable of making X at the time of the primary reference. This, in
187
fact, is the Samour-Donahue scenario. The problem here is that
even if there is no dispute that the subsequent inventor was the first
to actually make X, the compound lacks novelty and is therefore
unpatentable as a new composition of matter because it probably
188
could have been made in the prior art. This disturbing result
suggests that the Von Bramer doctrine, in fact, never died.

185. The Patent Office has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to make this argument. See In re
Coker, 463 F.2d 1344, 1346–48 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (rejecting the Board’s argument that a
PHOSITA in the field of organic chemistry is well aware of numerous methods for making
compounds like X even though the third-party patentee was unsuccessful in doing so).
186. For a hypothetical example, see supra note 84.
187. See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text.
188. The subsequent inventor can possibly obtain a “new use” patent for X even if it is
known in the prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining a patentable “process” to
“include[] a new use of a known . . . composition of matter, or material”); Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a new use for a
known compound can be patented with a “method” claim). There are, however, two principal
reasons why a “compound” or “composition of matter claim” covering X itself tends to be more
valuable than those directed to a specific “method of making” or “method of using” X. First,
compound claims afford the broadest protection. As Professor Harold Wegner explains,
Compound claims have always been the premium form of patent protection in the
chemical industry . . . . A claim to the compound, per se, dominates every method of
making that compound and every single use of that compound, every single mixture
of different components that includes that compound, and every end use composition
inclusive of the compound.
WEGNER, supra note 38, § 260, at 301; see also In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963)
(discussing the “well-recognized advantages” of composition-of-matter claims); MARTIN A.
VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA & PHARMACEUTICAL
LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 82–85 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the “hierarchy” of patent claims
and noting that composition patents are the best for pharmaceuticals).
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III. REFRAMING THE NOVELTY INQUIRY
The quintessential novelty problem endures because vestiges of
the Von Bramer doctrine remain. Though a document that merely
189
recites X by name or structure cannot by itself defeat patentability,
that modicum of disclosure is still sufficient to satisfy the first prong
190
of the anticipation inquiry. And because the examiner can easily
satisfy the second prong by using any additional references to show
191
that a PHOSITA could rely on knowledge in the art to make X,
establishing a prima facie case of anticipation is relatively easy. In

Second and relatedly, method patents are difficult to enforce because the patentee
“acquires only the right to preclude others from using the chemical in the exact manner he has
disclosed.” Eggert, supra note 136, at 781. Thus, the new-use patent might be too narrow to
cover other uses for X that come to the fore during its lifespan. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The
Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (“The discovery
of a new use for an old drug might support a patent on a method of treatment, but such a patent
offers little effective protection against generic competition once the drug itself is off-patent and
may lawfully be sold for an older, unpatented use.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the
FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2007) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA] (“Patents on particular methods of treatment involving the use
of a drug are generally considered less valuable[] because they cannot be used to stop
competitors from selling the same product for other uses.”); Roin, supra note 35, at 548 n.243
(describing ways to avoid infringing a new-use patent).
Third, a patentee seeking a new-use claim may face a formidable nonobviousness
hurdle. See Allegheny Drop Forge Co. v. Portec, Inc., 541 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1976) (“A new
use for an old process or product is patentable if the new use or application is itself not ‘obvious’
to [a PHOSITA].”); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1100 (2007) (explaining that in the drug context, a new-use patent “may
be difficult to obtain because the ‘new’ use may have been obvious, even if it was not obvious
that the new use would be effective”).
But despite these drawbacks, a method patent can provide fairly strong protection in
certain situations. See, e.g., Lorie Ann Morgan & Jeffrey Tidwell, Patents: United States
Perspective, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY 2616, 2617 (James
Swarbick ed., 3d ed. 2007) (arguing that method-of-use claims can afford important protection
for pharmaceuticals because FDA approval is linked to specific therapeutic uses); Kevin
Outterson, Death from the Public Domain?, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 45, 50 (2009), http://
www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol87/pdf/87TexasLRevSeeAlso45.pdf (observing
that if X is already patented or in the public domain, pharmaceutical companies will seek claims
for new uses or formulations). Perhaps not surprisingly, savvy patentees who pursue
composition-of-matter claims to X often also include at least one method-of-use claim so that if
an opponent (in litigation) uncovers prior art sufficient to invalidate the former, the patentee
will retain a strong patent position. WEGNER, supra note 38, § 261, at 302.
Yet regardless of the potential availability of a method-of-use patent, a subsequent
inventor should not have to settle for one if the asserted prior art has not truly enabled X; the
subsequent inventor should still be able to claim the compound itself.
189. See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 84, 186 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text.
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sum, X’s mere appearance in a document often places it on the fast
track to anticipation. Considering the presumptions and proof
problems described above, a subsequent inventor’s attempt to patent
X can be difficult if not impossible. To solve this problem, this Part
offers a new analytical framework for gauging X’s novelty.
A. A New Paradigm
1. Mechanics. Determining which references should be available
to the examiner lies at the core of the quintessential novelty problem.
The first question is whether a third-party patent merely reciting X
should even serve as anticipatory prior art. The second question is
whether there should be a limit on the potential universe of
secondary references that can be used to prove that the PHOSITA
could make X at the time of the primary reference.
First, a third-party patent would not enjoy a presumption of
enablement under the new paradigm. Determining whether the
document can serve as prior art for anticipation purposes would
depend on the amount of relevant, substantive technical information
it discloses. For instance, if X appears among a voluminous list of
compounds with no technical information about X’s synthesis, then
the document would be insufficient to serve as anticipatory prior art
because the mere recitation of chemical name or structure adds
192
nothing to the storehouse of knowledge. Thus, in contrast to the
current regime, the third-party patent’s mere recitation of a name or
structure would not, without more, raise a presumption that the
reference is enabled. Logically, if a third-party patent disclosing an
unsuccessful attempt to make X is insufficient to anticipate, it is hard
to understand why one merely reciting a structure warrants different
193
(or better) treatment.

192. Technically speaking, it is possible for a shotgun reference (one reciting a voluminous
list of compounds) to sufficiently enable each recited compound. See In re Sivaramakrishnan,
673 F.2d 1383, 1384–85 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that in contrast to Wiggins and the applicant’s
contention that the disclosure was speculative, a PHOSITA could follow the reference’s
teachings and rely on knowledge in the art to make the specific compound at issue, even though
the teaching was generic); Ex Parte A, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1716, 1718–19 (B.P.A.I. 1990) (explaining
that if a reference specifically teaches a listed compound, the reference anticipates regardless of
the size of the list).
193. See CURTIS, supra note 49, § 292 (explaining that speculations about an experiment
lacking in practical direction “are entirely analogous in their character to abortive and
unsuccessful experiments in practice”).
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On the other hand, if the document discloses a theoretical
method for making X, in the first instance the disclosure would be
presumed nonenabling because unpredictability in the art would raise
an inference that undue experimentation would be required to make
194
the compound. The presumption could be rebutted, but unlike
under the current framework, the examiner would have the initial
burden of proving enablement by a preponderance of the evidence.
Rebuttal would require the examiner to show that the prior art
provided some specific technique that enabled a PHOSITA to make
195
X. Here, the examiner could point to information disclosed in the
third-party patent itself and, as discussed below, a limited universe of
secondary references. If the examiner rebuts the presumption, the
burden would shift to the applicant to rebut the examiner’s
contention of enablement, just as in the current framework. And
although the burden of production could shift back and forth, in the
new paradigm the ultimate burden of persuasion would still rest with
196
the examiner. Thus, if the examiner could not carry the burden, the
197
allegedly anticipating reference would be insufficient to anticipate.
Second, the new analytical framework would limit the universe
of secondary references that could be used to prove that a PHOSITA
could make X at the time of the primary reference. Importantly, only
documents with publication dates earlier than or contemporaneous
with the third-party patent could be used for this purpose. The

194. See supra Part I.B.2.
195. The principle that anticipatory prior art must provide specific details finds its roots in
English patent cases:
Whatever, therefore, is essential to the invention must [appear in] the prior
publication. If specific details are necessary for the practical working . . . of the
alleged invention, they must be found substantially in the prior publication. Apparent
generality, or a proposition not true to its full extent, will not prejudice a subsequent
statement which is limited and accurate . . . .
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 n.24 (1870) (citing Hill v. Evans, (1862) 45 Eng.
Rep. 1195, 1200 (Q.B.)). In a leading British case addressing anticipatory enablement, Lord
Hoffmann described the requisite level of disclosure for a third-party patent:
To anticipate the [subsequent inventor’s] claim the prior publication must contain
clear and unmistakable directions to do what the [subsequent inventor] claims to have
invented. A signpost, however clear, upon the road to the . . . invention will not
suffice. The prior inventor must be clearly shown to have planted his flag at the
precise destination before the [subsequent inventor].
Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., [1972] R.P.C. 457, 486 (U.K.)
(citations omitted).
196. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
197. And if there are no additional grounds for unpatentability, the Patent Office must grant
the patent. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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examiner could no longer point to recent documents to prove what a
PHOSITA knew long ago. And like the primary reference and other
forms of prior art, the secondary reference must have been
“sufficiently accessible” to the PHOSITA during the relevant time
198
period. Limiting the universe of secondary references in this way
would reduce problems with hindsight stemming from speculation
199
about the PHOSITA’s then-existing abilities.
2. Application. To illustrate the new analytical framework,
consider the following hypothetical patent prosecution, which shows
that novelty problems can arise even when X does not appear in a
voluminous list of compounds.
Suppose that in 2006 an inventor at a drug company synthesizes
X, a steroid that exhibits promising pain-relieving activity. Later that
year, the inventor files a patent application claiming X. The examiner
rejects the claim under § 102(b) as anticipated by a third-party patent
that issued in 1969 (primary reference) disclosing the following:
We have discovered that treatment of cortisone under the
conditions herein described yields steroid W in good yield. Various
changes and modifications might be made by those skilled in the art
without departing from the spirit of the invention. The solvent and
specific reaction temperature employed will be primarily dependent
on the particular reactants used therein. It is envisioned that
modifications of the technique described herein will produce
200
steroids X, Y, and Z in excellent yield.

198. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to mean that [during the
relevant time period] the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public
interested in the art; dissemination and public accessibility are the keys to the legal
determination whether a prior art reference was ‘published.’”); cf. In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (explaining that a document is publicly accessible if it “has been disseminated
or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the
subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and
comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research
or experimentation”).
199. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
200. This type of broad disclosure is ubiquitous in patent documents. See Seymore, Teaching
Function, supra note 45, at 633–41 (exploring the use of “patentese” to “cast [an] invention in
broad terms”). In this hypothetical, some language is excerpted from Certain Halogenated 2-(2Thiazolyl)aminofuran-5-ones, U.S. Patent No. 3,444,178 (filed June 16, 1967).
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Although X was never made, the examiner contends that the
disclosure is sufficiently detailed to overcome a presumption of
nonenablement.
In response, the applicant argues that the presumption has not
been rebutted because steroid synthesis is so unpredictable that a
PHOSITA cannot extrapolate the result from one experiment (the
synthesis of W) to another (the synthesis of X) with any reasonable
201
expectation of success. This is true, for example, because minor
202
changes in structure can result in large changes in reactivity.
Impliedly conceding the argument, the examiner then attempts to
show knowledge in the art by asserting a review article entitled “Fifty
Years of Steroid Chemistry” published in 2005 (secondary reference).
Although the review article does not report or cite a synthesis for X,
it notes that steroids of the class encompassing W, X, Y, and Z were
first made in the 1960s.
The applicant responds with both a substantive and a procedural
argument. First, the applicant contends that the review article, like
the primary reference, is nonenabling because it lacks specific
information about how to make X. Second, the applicant contends
that the review article is an improper secondary reference because it
postdates the allegedly anticipating reference by thirty-six years.
Upon reconsideration, the examiner acquiesces and withdraws the
§ 102(b) rejection.

201. One way to test enablement is to determine if a skilled scientist would have believed
that the inventor’s success with the described embodiment(s) “could be extrapolated with a
reasonable expectation of success” to other embodiments encompassed by the broad claims. In
re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Another jurist framed the analysis in similar
terms:
[W]ith respect to generic claims to chemical and biological inventions, the scope of
the claims is limited to what [the PHOSITA] could reasonably predict from the
inventor’s disclosure. This precept recognizes that one skilled in these chemical and
biological arts cannot always reasonably predict how different chemical compounds
and elements might behave under varying circumstances. Thus, in so-called
“chemical” patent law practice, the claims of a patent are limited by the scope of what
the disclosure reasonably teaches to [the PHOSITA].
Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839 (M.D. Fla. 1976), aff’d, 584 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1978). Important considerations include “the type[s] of reactions, the state of the art,
the representative nature of the examples, and the breadth of the claims.” In re Rainer, 377 F.2d
1006, 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
202. See AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 775 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (recognizing that “the properties of these structurally similar compounds [can] vary
significantly with minor structural changes”); In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 625 (C.C.P.A. 1938)
(explaining that a patentee that discloses one member of a class of compounds may not be
entitled to claim the entire class because certain members may react differently).
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This new framework fulfills the fundamental purpose of the
novelty requirement because it allows the applicant to claim an
203
invention that the PHOSITA was incapable of making.
B. Benefits of the Proposed Framework
1. The Framework Will Solve the Quintessential Novelty Problem.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the quintessential novelty
problem is that the mere recitation of X by name or structure in a
third-party patent can ultimately thwart a subsequent inventor’s claim
to the compound, even though the subsequent inventor has added to
society’s knowledge by creating it. The proposed framework would
finally put this vestige of Von Bramer to rest, because such a thirdparty patent could no longer serve as an anticipatory prior art
reference. But if the structural recitation is accompanied with
minimal experimental details, the burden would shift to the examiner
to prove that a PHOSITA could have made X using then-existing
knowledge without undue experimentation. And because the
examiner would have a limited universe of secondary references
available, the scales of patentability would now tip in favor of the
inventor who actually makes X.
2. The Framework Will More Accurately Determine the Level of
Skill in the Art. Aside from protecting the patent rights of subsequent
inventors, the new framework focuses more attention on the
204
PHOSITA. The heart of the enablement facet of the anticipation
inquiry often turns on what the PHOSITA knows and whether the
205
PHOSITA can fill in gaps in the reference. Because “the level of
skill in the [relevant] art is [the] prism or lens through which [the
factfinder] views the prior art and the claimed invention,” the
206
importance of this hypothetical construct cannot be overstated.

203. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion identifying the relevant factors for constructing the PHOSITA, see
supra note 21. For additional commentary on the PHOSITA’s identity, see generally John O.
Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37 (1991); Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who Is the Person Having
Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002).
205. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
206. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Yet it is very easy to mischaracterize the PHOSITA, either
207
because of confusion about the artisan’s identity or because of
208
insufficient factfinding. Overestimating the PHOSITA’s knowledge
and level of skill is particularly problematic in the enablement
inquiry. This is because in both patent examination and litigation
contexts, the “enablement determination is made retrospectively, i.e.,
by looking back to the filing date of the patent application and
determining whether undue experimentation would have been
209
required to make and use the claimed invention at that time.”

207. The confusion arises for several reasons. First, several commentators argue that the
PHOSITA does not remain constant from section to section of the patent statute but rather
changes based on the purpose being served at that time. Burk & Lemley, supra note 121, at
1189–90 (citing Tresansky, supra note 204, at 52–53). Thus, “[t]he PHOSITA for purposes of
obviousness may not necessarily be the PHOSITA for purposes of enablement, written
description, definiteness, or equivalence.” Id. at 1189. This means, of course, that the different
PHOSITAs can exhibit different characteristics between sections. Id. at 1190 (explaining that
while the authorities view the PHOSITA in the nonobviousness context as a problem solver,
they historically viewed the PHOSITA for enablement purposes as one who “show[ed] no such
innovative tendency, but [was] simply a user of the technology”). Second, “the knowledge of the
PHOSITA in a particular field . . . frequently change[s] over time.” Mark A. Lemley, The
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2005); see also infra
note 212. Third and relatedly, evidence shows that the PHOSITA varies by industry. BURK &
LEMLEY, supra note 66, at 115 (comparing the biotechnology PHOSITA to the software
PHOSITA). Fourth, unlike the PHOSITA who has a common or ordinary level of skill, patent
law presumes that inventors and patentees have extraordinary skill. Burk & Lemley, supra note
121, at 1189 (“Unlike the inventor, who almost by definition is presumed to be one of
extraordinary skill, the PHOSITA standard contemplates some median or common level of
skill.” (footnote omitted)); see also N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Because inventors generally have extraordinary
skill, their scientific writings outside the patent are rarely even a source of knowledge about
ordinary skill in the art.”); Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 189–90 (2007) (“Far from being one of ordinary skill, the
inventor is by definition one of extraordinary skill, so that once the mental work has been
completed, all that remains to be done has been characterized as the ‘work of the mere
artisan’—not the work of an inventor.”).
208. For instance, Judge Rich described the PHOSITA as a “plodder” who “thinks along
the line of conventional wisdom in the art” and does not “undertake[] to innovate, whether by
patient, and often expensive, systematic research[,] or by extraordinary insights.” Standard Oil
Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Until quite recently, Judge Rich’s
view of the PHOSITA as an unimaginative and uncreative person persisted in patent law even
as inventions have become more technologically complex. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to
Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885,
888, 891 (2004) (explaining how the Federal Circuit “all but ignored” the PHOSITA because
the court presumed “that PHOSITA [was] an uncreative plodder, incapable of making
inventions of his own”). The Federal Circuit recently abandoned the plodder presumption,
however, and now strives to accurately elucidate the PHOSITA’s identity. See infra notes 215–
19 and accompanying text.
209. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Retrospection raises two concerns. The first concern, as discussed in
210
Part II.A.2, is the potential for hindsight bias. The notion that X
could not have been that difficult for a PHOSITA to make becomes
211
more problematic as the filing date becomes more distant. The
second concern is that the PHOSITA’s knowledge and abilities can
change over time, most notably between the time of filing and the
212
time of the enablement analysis. The corollary is that “whether a
disclosure is enabling can shift over time; as the knowledge of the
PHOSITA shifts, an identical disclosure may shift from not being
213
enabled to being enabled.”
This has led Professor Timothy
Holbrook to conclude that “[e]nablement, while conceptually simple,
214
is legally and factually complex.”
215
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court
reemphasized the importance of accurately determining the
216
PHOSITA’s identity and knowledge. In resolving whether the
nonobviousness PHOSITA could combine the teachings of the prior
art to arrive at the claimed invention, the Court rejected the Federal
217
Circuit’s narrow and inflexible approach to the question. Now the

210. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
211. See sources cited supra note 121.
212. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 41–43 (2009) (explaining that the level of skill in the art may have evolved since
the filing date, which is important because enablement is assessed at the time of application).
213. Holbrook, supra note 31, at 129–30.
214. Id. at 129.
215. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
216. See id. at 420–21 (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.”); see also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1000 (2008) (“[After KSR,] courts will
have to pay more attention than they have in the last quarter-century to who the PHOSITA is
and what he or she thinks.”); Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 237, 250 (2008) (recognizing that KSR banished the Federal Circuit’s “dullard”
PHOSITA).
217. Before KSR, the Federal Circuit and the C.C.P.A. resolved the question with the
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) test, which deemed a patent claim obvious if some
motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings could be found in the prior art, the
nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a PHOSITA. See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining the TSM test); In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A.
1961) (“The mere fact that it is possible to find two isolated disclosures which might be
combined in such a way to produce a new compound does not necessarily render such
production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the desirability of the
proposed combination.”). The KSR Court held that the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the
TSM test is inconsistent with the “expansive and flexible” approach to nonobviousness set forth
in prior precedent. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12, 17,
18 (1966); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)).
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Federal Circuit appears to devote more attention to the PHOSITA in
218
219
both its nonobviousness and § 112 enablement cases. As a matter
of logical consistency, it is now time to also devote more attention to
the anticipatory-enablement PHOSITA. By requiring the examiner to
prove with specificity what the PHOSITA knew during the relevant
time period and limiting the universe of secondary references, the
220
proposed framework does just that.
3. The Framework Will Reduce the Chaff in the Patent Literature.
221
Patents are a form of technical literature. Considering that § 112

218. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301–02
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Ordinarily, [a PHOSITA] expects a concentrated or purified ingredient to
retain the same properties it exhibited in a mixture, and for those properties to be amplified
when the ingredient is concentrated or purified . . . . If it is known how to perform such
isolation, doing so ‘is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common
sense.’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 402–03)); Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that the obviousness analysis “is not the result of a
rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a case,” but requires a
consideration of “the common sense of those skilled in the art”).
219. In the predictable arts, for many years the courts adopted the view that a single
embodiment was often sufficient to enable a broad claim. See, e.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v.
Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that a patent need only disclose a
single embodiment to satisfy enablement); In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944)
(explaining that an inventor “is generally allowed [broad] claims, when the art permits, which
cover more than the specific embodiment shown”). In other words, a PHOSITA in the
predictable arts could always fill in gaps omitted from the disclosure. Seymore, supra note 46, at
282–83. A few years before KSR, the Federal Circuit vitiated the “single embodiment”
enablement doctrine and moved toward a more stringent “full scope” enablement standard. See
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that
a disclosure that enabled an injector with a pressure jacket was insufficient to support a claim
that covered injectors with and without pressure jackets); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d
1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that when the claims covered a Type 1 or a Type 2
aluminum coating, yet the patent only described a Type 2 coating, the claims were nonenabled
because a PHOSITA could not fill in the gaps without undue experimentation); Seymore, supra
note 46, at 284–89 (describing the emergence of “full scope” enablement as a “lever to
invalidate patents”). Several commentators suggest that the new standard is tied to a resurgence
of the Federal Circuit’s written-description doctrine, which has essentially blurred the line
between it and enablement. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with
the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–63 (2000) (contending that “neither the Federal Circuit nor the
C.C.P.A. has ever articulated a persuasive rationale for distinguishing the written description
requirement from the enablement requirement”); cf. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping,
Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that the two disclosure requirements are
“closely related” and “usually rise and fall together”).
220. See supra Part III.A.
221. For instance, like technical journals, patents show the state of technology, set forth
what others have already achieved, and provide technical information about procedures that
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compels patentees to provide an enabling disclosure, a PHOSITA
should theoretically be able to rely on the patent document and
existing knowledge in the art to practice the claimed subject matter
222
without undue experimentation. This teaching function becomes
particularly important when one considers that most information
223
disclosed in a patent is never published in another medium.
Yet although patents are in many ways quite similar to other
224
technical information sources, they are not often viewed as an
225
important channel for information flow. One reason is that patents
“seldom teach enough so that someone can actually go out and
226
actually do the invention without some additional work.” Relatedly,
patent documents are often indecipherable, even to those with

others then need not repeat. THOMAS T. GORDON & ARTHUR S. COOKFAIR, PATENT
FUNDAMENTALS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 51 (2d ed. 2000).
222. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
223. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 554 (2009) (“Much of
the information contained in—or that ought to be in—patents is not published elsewhere.”);
Esteban Burrone & Guriqbal Singh Jaiya, Intellectual Property (IP) Rights and Innovation in
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 3 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/pdf/iprs_innovation.pdf (“It has been estimated that patent
documents contain 70% of the world’s accumulated technical knowledge and that most of the
information contained in patent documents is either never published elsewhere or is first
disclosed through the publication of the patent application.”).
224. See supra note 221. It is also true that “in many ways, a scientific publication and the
patent document share similar goals—namely to disclose something novel, to teach fellow
artisans how to replicate the invention or discovery, and to spur further innovation in the field.”
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 663 (footnotes omitted).
225. See Wesley M. Cohen, Akira Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh,
R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES.
POL’Y 1349, 1362–64 (2002) (presenting empirical research showing that among information
sources for diffusing research and development in the United States, patents rank third behind
publications and informal information exchange). Several commentators have speculated as to
why this is so. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 665 n.227.
226. Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2007, 2025 (2005) (quoting Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n 53 (Mar. 20, 2002)
(statement of Daniel McCurdy), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020320trans.pdf).
This is true, at least in part, because an inventor need not create a working embodiment or
engage in any experimentation before obtaining the patent. See supra note 123. Rather, an
inventor can describe an invention with fictitious, constructed examples. And if these examples
lack sufficient detail, there is a presumption that a PHOSITA can rely on knowledge in the field
to fill in the missing information. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. In sum, a
disclosure that cannot teach a PHOSITA how to practice the invention has little substantive
value. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 22 n.16 (2008)
(“[R]esearch suggests that scientists don’t in fact gain much of their knowledge from patents,
turning instead to other sources.”).
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227

specialized knowledge. Rather than fulfilling the statutory mandate
to provide a written description using “full, clear, concise, and exact
228
terms,” many applicants draft a document laden with jargon and
229
formalistic, imprecise language. The applicant can thereby cast the
230
invention in broad terms, essentially stretching the disclosure.
Although applicants may engage in this activity to preserve claim
231
232
scope, to set the stage for continuation practice, and to avoid
227. See, e.g., Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 713–14 (1996) (observing that chemical
patents “tend to be shrouded in chemical nomenclature,” which makes them hard to
comprehend); Note, supra note 226, at 2022 (explaining that patents “are notoriously hard to
interpret”).
228. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
229. See Note, supra note 226, at 2025 (“Although patent applicants are supposed to provide
a ‘full, clear, [and] concise’ written description of their invention so that their peers in the
industry can easily read and understand it, very few patents today meet that standard. Instead,
the goals of clarity and brevity take a back seat to drafting strategies meant to ensure that
patents are interpreted broadly by the courts.”). Notwithstanding the disclosure requirements of
§ 112, many patentees adopt the view that the written description does not define the invention
but rather provides examples or embodiments of the invention. Rather than use language that
explicitly describes what the invention is, for instance, a savvy drafter would say something like,
“In an embodiment, one aspect of the invention relates to . . . .” See George F. Wheeler,
Creative Claim Drafting: Claim Drafting Strategies, Specification Preparation, and Prosecution
Tactics, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 43 (2003) (advising patent claim drafters to
couch specific inventions in the broadest manner possible).
230. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 634–35 (noting how the disclosure can
be stretched by “employ[ing] boilerplate patentese to help cast the invention in broad terms”).
231. The U.S. patent system uses a peripheral claiming regime in which claim language sets
forth the metes and bounds of the invention, like a deed to real property. See 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”). Perhaps
not surprisingly, patentees exploit the inherent indeterminacy of language to maximize claim
scope by deliberately building ambiguity into the patent document. Clarisa Long, Information
Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 542 & n.187 (2004); see also R. Carl Moy,
Subjecting Rembrandt to the Rule of Law: Rule-Based Solutions for Determining the
Patentability of Business Methods, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1047, 1082 (2002) (“[P]eripheral
claiming imposes no inherent limit on the level of abstraction that the patentee is able to use in
the claim.”).
232. A continuation application is a second application for the same invention disclosed in a
parent (original) application that is filed before the parent application either issues as a patent
or becomes abandoned. 35 U.S.C. § 120. It has the identical written description as the parent
and enjoys the benefit of the parent’s earlier filing date. Id. Applicants file continuation
applications for many reasons. For example, an applicant may decide to prosecute a parent
application with narrow claims (which will issue relatively quickly) and then prosecute broader
claims in the continuation application. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A.
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 161–62 (4th ed. 2006)
(describing continuation applications, as well as the strategies and benefits associated with
them). An applicant can use this strategy “to gain advantages over competitors by waiting to see
what product the competitor will make, and then drafting patent claims specifically designed to
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234

they also
linguistic pitfalls and problems with new matter,
occasionally do so to “muddy the waters in a defensive or nuisance
235
maneuver” to thwart subsequent, deserving inventors.
Under the new paradigm, padding patent documents with
unclaimed subject matter will no longer give a third-party patentee a
236
strategic advantage. This raises hope that patentees will draft
leaner, more technically robust documents. Thus, the new paradigm
could help transform patents into repositories of valuable technical
237
knowledge competitive with other information sources.
4. The Framework Will Promote Innovation and Other Goals of
Patent Policy. Promoting innovation is often viewed as the primary
238
goal of the patent system. Innovation is a complex process that

cover that product.” Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004); see also EDWARD F. O’CONNOR, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND LITIGATION 116–17 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that continuation practice
gives patentees considerable flexibility to craft claims directed to specific products).
233. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 635–36 (describing language traps that
may lead to an undesired claim construction).
234. Upon filing, an applicant cannot amend the disclosure to introduce new matter into the
application. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure
of the invention.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f) (2009) (“No amendment may introduce new matter into
the disclosure of an application.”); see also MPEP, supra note 125, § 706.03(o) (directing
examiners to be on alert for new matter). The new-matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 132 and its
corollary, the written-description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, “both serve to ensure that
the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject matter on the application filing
date.” TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d
1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
235. Wainwright, supra note 34, at 221–22. When a patentee discloses more than he or she
enables for § 112 purposes, that subject matter can nonetheless be asserted as prior art against
subsequent inventors, at which time it will enjoy a presumption of enablement. See supra notes
125–27 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 656–57 (arguing that transforming
the patent into a readable teaching document and making an actual reduction to practice the
standard of disclosure would produce patent documents that could achieve this result).
238. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public
domain through disclosure.”); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979) (noting that one goal of patent law is “[to] promote[] disclosure of inventions to
stimulate further innovation”). This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the “ultimate purpose” of the patent grant is to “promot[e]
the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the
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brings inventions into widespread, practical use by “feed[ing] on the
239
known and convert[ing] it into the new.” In his recent book, Driving
Innovation, Michael Gollin contends that innovation is a three-stage
cyclical process in which individuals first engage in creative labor
using existing knowledge. The product of that labor is then
distributed among and adopted by society, ultimately adding to the
pool of accessible knowledge for other creative individuals to use and
240
improve on. Patent laws affect each stage by providing incentives to
241
invent, disclose, and design around patented technology; by defining
boundaries; and by modulating dissemination and the entry of
242
knowledge into the accessible domain.
Under the current regime, X may never even enter the
innovation cycle. When a third-party patent discloses but does not
243
claim X, the patent likely does not enable X. Thus, the disclosure
provides the PHOSITA and the public with no substantive technical
information about the compound. When the Patent Office denies a
244
patent to a subsequent inventor who can actually make X, it not
only deprives that inventor of a potential opportunity to reap an
economic benefit from the compound but also deprives the patent
system of an opportunity to obtain a technically robust disclosure that
245
actually enables X. And because the subsequent inventor will

public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8).
239. MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 11 (2008).
240. Id. at 15–19.
241. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present
Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 61 (2003) (“The patent system in this country has
generally been seen as offering inventors an incentive to do something they might not otherwise
do—for example, invent, disclose, commercialize, or design around.” (citing DONALD S.
CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN & F. SCOTT
KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 58–90 (2d ed. 2001) (exploring diverse incentive theories of
the patent system))); see also State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design
around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of
innovations to the marketplace.”).
242. GOLLIN, supra note 239, at 11, 18–19.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 26–30.
244. A subsequent inventor can possibly obtain a new-use patent, however. For an
exploration and criticism of new-use patents in this scenario, see discussion supra note 188.
245. Rejecting a claim to X will essentially foreclose the opportunity to fully exploit the
compound. Cf. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Problem of Gene Patents, 3 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUD. L. REV. 701, 735 (2004) (arguing that inventions that are never exploited, and thus that
never reach the market, are economically irrelevant). In addition, if the subsequent inventor
abandons the patent application, the public will not gain access to the presumably enabling

SEYMORE IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

12/29/2010 5:30:42 PM

RETHINKING NOVELTY IN PATENT LAW

971

246

probably not disclose X in another medium, the public may never
247
get possession of the compound.
Allowing a subsequent inventor to claim X, on the other hand,
will have the opposite effect. First, the subsequent inventor can
exploit the compound, thereby providing a reward for the inventive
248
effort and encouraging further creative activity. Second, the new
framework will add to the store of knowledge for others to use.
Assuming that the subsequent inventor files an application that
complies with the requirements of § 112, the public will finally obtain
an enabling (and, hopefully, technically robust) disclosure once the
249
application publishes or the patent issues. By opening the door to
X’s patentability, the new framework will promote innovation and
other goals of the patent system.
C. Criticisms
Although the new framework has several potential benefits, it
has implications for the patent system that extend beyond the
question of novelty. This Section explores some potential criticisms.
1. Extended Pendency. One potential concern with the new
paradigm is that it will increase the pendency of applications in the

technical information disclosed in it. That the subsequent inventor will disclose the information
in another medium is also unlikely. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
Turning back to the availability of a new-use patent, most would agree that it would
provide less economic or technical benefit than a (broader) patent covering the compound itself.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA, supra note 188, at 351 (explaining that method-of-use
patents are generally less valuable than the patent covering the compound itself); see also
Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J.
ECON. 34, 52 (1995) (arguing that narrow patent protection inhibits the disclosure and
dissemination of information useful to others).
246. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
247. See GOLLIN, supra note 239, at 18 (“[The cycle] stops when creative people lack access
to information, . . . when innovations are lost, and when law and circumstances make
innovations inaccessible.”); supra Part I.B.
248. Patent law “seeks to foster and reward invention” with the hope that the disclosure will
“stimulate further innovation and . . . permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires.” Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Paulik v.
Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“The reason for the patent system is to
encourage innovation and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods and trade
benefits.”). But “[e]ven if no incentive is required to produce an innovation, providing a reward
after the creative act encourages [the inventor] and others to do more creative work in the
future.” GOLLIN, supra note 239, at 38.
249. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 627 (arguing that the teaching
function should be an important goal of the patent system).
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Patent Office. It is certainly true that requiring the examiner to prove
250
that a prior art reference is enabling will impact production goals.
This is a valid concern because the Patent Office’s current
251
compensation system emphasizes throughput, which means that it
252
rewards examiners for certain activities but not for others. For
253
instance, the first Office Action and a final allowance or rejection of
an application each count toward the examiner’s quota. But searching
the prior art, corresponding back and forth with the applicant, and
254
issuing subsequent Office Actions—including the final one—do not.
An examiner thus has little incentive to bicker with an applicant over
255
anticipatory enablement. Rather, the examiner is better served by
forcing a concession upon the applicant and then allowing a patent to
256
issue.
250. “Production goals are the number of specific actions and decisions that patent
examiners must make about patent applications they review during a 2-week period.” U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE:
HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 2
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf. Implicit in these goals is an
estimate of the time it takes to review a patent application.
251. The amount of time the Patent Office allots for an examiner to dispose of a case
depends on factors like seniority and the technology involved. See id. at 7. Time estimates vary.
Compare John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (estimating a sixteen- to seventeen-hour average
time allotment), with Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1500 n.19 (2001) (aggregating time estimates, which range from eight to thirty-two
hours, depending on the technology).
252. See generally MPEP, supra note 125, § 1705 (describing the procedures for crediting an
examiner’s activities on the Examiner’s Case Action Worksheet and the Biweekly Examiner
Time and Activity Report).
253. An Office Action is an official communication from the Patent Office stating the
examiner’s position on patentability and the basis for any claim rejections. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (2009) (describing the nature and content of the Office Action).
254. See MPEP, supra note 125, § 1705 (setting out which examiner actions receive a count).
255. Under the status quo, a savvy examiner who wants to maximize monetary and
performance rewards should reject the application once, issue one Office Action, and then allow
the application. See Nikolas J. Uhlir, Note, Throwing a Wrench in the System: Size-Dependent
Properties, Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 327, 340 n.88 (2007)
(explaining the compensation system and the incentives it gives to examiners).
256. See ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY 97–98 (2001) (discussing the examiner’s
concerns and incentives). Although allowances and final rejections both count toward an
examiner’s production goals, several commentators argue that the incentive system favors
allowance. See Lemley, supra note 251, at 1496 n.3 (“[E]xaminers must write up reasons for
rejection, but not reasons for allowance, giving them more incentives to allow rather than reject
an application.”). Thus, the skewed incentives of the current regime “make it easier and more
desirable for examiners to grant patents rather than reject them.” Joseph Farrell & Robert P.
Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent
Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943,
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There are at least three responses to this point. First, the Patent
257
Office recently decided to review its production goals. This long258
awaited “completely fresh look” at the examination process will
hopefully lead the Patent Office to fix its compensation system.
Second, although negotiation is an integral facet of patent
259
prosecution, the Patent Office’s incentive and reward structure
should not, as a normative matter, compromise an applicant’s ability
260
to obtain a patent for a claim to which he or she is rightly entitled. If
the examiner rejects a claim to X, it should be because the compound
is truly unpatentable, not because the examiner persuaded the
applicant to acquiesce for the sake of expediency. At least in the
novelty context, requiring the examiner to prove that an allegedly
anticipatory reference is enabling will help fix this problem.
Third and relatedly, eliminating the presumption of enablement
261
will force examiners to scrutinize prior art more carefully. Many
commentators and proponents of patent reform have indeed argued
that a large number of patents would not issue if the examiner had
262
access to, and adequate time to consider, the relevant prior art. So

945 (2004). Savvy applicants are aware of the skewed incentives. See Lemley & Moore, supra
note 232, at 75 (contending that “an examiner faced with a determined applicant has every
incentive to give in and allow the patent”).
257. The current time estimates and quotas were established in 1976. Despite criticism over
the past decade, Patent Office officials have not updated them to reflect increasing technical
complexity, and those officials are insensitive to the number of pages or claims in an application.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 250, at 1–9 (discussing the problems
examiners have with outdated, unrealistic production goals that do not accurately reflect the
time needed to review applications). Finally, in response to the GAO Report, the Patent Office
is seeking to reevaluate its production-management system. Patent Examiner Production Goals
Study, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 15, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
comp/proc/pgs/pgshom.htm; see also Stephen Barr, Backlog, Quotas Overwhelm Patent
Examiners, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, at D1 (discussing the GAO Report and comments from
the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); sources cited supra note 4.
258. Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 4.
259. See MIELE, supra note 256, at 96–97 (describing the patent-prosecution process).
260. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
261. As one commentator explains, under the current system examiners have a monetary
disincentive to engage in an extensive prior art search because “doing so means that they have
more work to do with less pay than they would receive had they not searched for the art and
simply issued the patent.” David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation
on the Duty of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L.
REV. 205, 228 (2002).
262. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
EMORY L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (exploring criticisms); Lemley, supra note 251, at 1500 (“[M]uch
of the most relevant prior art isn’t easy to find—it consists of [third-party activities] that don’t
show up in any searchable database and will not be found by examiners in a hurry.”); Michael
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to the extent that the new framework would lead to an increased
attentiveness to prior art, it would improve the quality of application
263
review and ultimately the quality of issued patents.
2. Information Dissemination. Another concern is that the new
paradigm will create a disincentive for third-party patentees to
disclose any more than is necessary to satisfy the disclosure
264
requirements of § 112. Most information disclosed in patents is
265
never published elsewhere. If an inventor withholds knowledge, it
266
will likely be lost. Furthermore, Judge Pauline Newman believes
that any paradigm that might lead a patentee to limit the content of
267
the disclosure frustrates innovation and technological advancement.
But the nature and quality of the information under
consideration is important. The new framework does not seek to
curtail the disclosure of substantive technical information. To the
contrary, written descriptions should include more information
because it makes the patent document a more robust source of
268
technical information. And to the extent that this additional
information describes work actually performed, it allows the patent
document to more closely resemble the experimental section of a

Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196
(2007) (“A high-quality prior art search is difficult because of resource and time limitations.”).
One reform goal, stated in the Introduction to the Patent Reform Act of 2007 as proposed in the
Senate, was “to improve patent quality and the patent application process.” S. REP. No. 110-259,
pt. 1, at 5 (2008).
263. Improving patent examination and patent quality are now priorities in the Patent
Office. See supra note 4.
264. This is also a potential criticism of the disclosure-dedication rule. See supra notes 124,
126 and accompanying text; see also Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 668–69
(responding to the criticism).
265. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
266. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 666 (discussing situations in which
“the patent system is the sole medium of disclosure” and arguing that a heightened disclosure
framework is needed when substantive technical information may otherwise be lost in
unreadable patent documents).
267. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1064–72 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (explaining that the disclosurededication rule imposes legal obstacles to the disclosure of scientific information and that those
obstacles will deter innovation).
268. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 652–57 (describing how, by requiring
working examples, written descriptions in patents could eventually provide as much useful
technical knowledge as experimental sections in scientific journals).
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269

technical journal. When this happens, the patent document can
achieve the goals it shares with scientific publications—“namely to
disclose something novel, to teach fellow artisans how to replicate the
270
invention or discovery, and to spur further innovation in the field.”
Therefore, it
may contribute significantly to bridging the divide between patent
law and the experimental sciences. Including working examples,
combined with some discussion of what is already known, serves a
teaching role because they both provide context and allow the
PHOSITA to more precisely (and more quickly) replicate the
271
invention or discovery.

In this scenario, more disclosure makes patents better vehicles for
272
disseminating technical information.
On the other hand, adding chaff to a patent document does not
273
promote the document’s disclosure function. The new paradigm
seeks to curtail inclusion of this material not merely because it makes
patent documents thicker, but because its presence has several
downsides. First, particularly in unpredictable fields, this disclosedbut-unclaimed subject matter is often unhelpful to the PHOSITA or
274
follow-on researchers because it lacks technical substance. And
second, it can create roadblocks for other inventors who can actually
275
enable the disclosed-but-unclaimed subject matter. Removing the
incentive to include chaff will lead patentees to draft technically
robust documents that can disseminate information better than those
276
produced under the current regime.

269. Id. at 656 & n.182 (explaining how the written description could resemble scientific
publications’ sections on experimental data, which “disclose[] working examples and other
experimental details”); see also supra note 221.
270. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 663 (footnotes omitted).
271. Id. at 664.
272. It currently appears that patents are not a dominant channel of information flow. See
Lemley, supra note 226, at 22 n.16 (“[R]esearch suggests that scientists don’t in fact gain much
of their knowledge from patents, turning instead to other sources.”); sources cited supra note
225. This is unfortunate because most of the information disclosed in patents is not disclosed in
another medium. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.3.
274. Unclaimed subject matter is not subject to the disclosure requirements of § 112. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
275. See Wainwright, supra note 34, at 221–22 (explaining how “nuisance prior art” can
discourage applicants to the point of abandoning their patent applications); supra note 235 and
accompanying text.
276. See supra Part III.B.3.
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CONCLUSION
The novelty requirement seeks to ensure that a patent will not
issue if the public already possesses the invention. Although current
novelty doctrine is sufficient to gauge possession for inventions in
applied technologies, it fails for those in unpredictable fields like
chemistry. It thus at times produces paradoxical outcomes at odds
with basic principles of patent law. By shifting presumptions and
burdens of proof, the proposed patent examination framework will
resolve these problems and improve the quality of both issued patents
and the patent literature. And because patent applications in nascent
technologies continue to rise, the proposed framework will spark
more interest in exploring how patent law and policy should evolve to
accommodate these technologies.

